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Abstract 
 
This thesis compared institutional ownership in family controlled and non-family controlled 
businesses and found that institutional ownership is less prevalent in the case of family controlled 
firms. In particular, concentrated ownership by the controlling family deterred institutional 
investment. When concentrated family ownership is controlled for, regression results showed that 
institutional investors avoided family controlled businesses, and that this avoidance behavior 
might be related to institutional investor size. Comparing institutional ownership of a firm’s largest 
five institutional holders and that of its smaller institutional investors showed that, while 
institutional investors have less ownership in family versus non-family controlled businesses, the 
evidence was stronger for the firm’s largest five institutional holders than for the small institutional 
investors. The analysis presented in this thesis concluded that some institutional investors may 
avoid family controlled businesses due to concerns over the investors’ ability to control firm 
management. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Family controlled businesses play a key role in the US economy. Approximately, one third of the 
fortune 500 companies are family controlled businesses (McConaughy et al, 2001; Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003). Family ventures start with the capital forming within the family, but as they expand, 
they look for other sources. Substantial numbers of family controlled businesses are market leaders 
in their respective industry and their stocks are publicly traded in high volume. On the other hand, 
institutional investors are now major contributors of the capital in the United States. Institutional 
holders with more than $100 million US dollars in funds, have control over the majority of the US 
equity capital market (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). There is also a trend towards more 
institutional holdings in both large and small firms (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). However, our 
study shows that the expansion of institutional holdings has been somewhat slower for family 
controlled businesses. Fernando et al. (2014) argued that family controlled businesses suffer from 
type 2 agency problems, in which large inside shareholders (i.e., family) may use their controlling 
power to extract private benefit at the expense of minority shareholders. They concluded that 
institutional investors are more capable of recognizing the agency problem and will avoid investing 
in family controlled businesses. In this study, we discuss four questions. First, we investigate 
whether family controlled businesses have a lower level of institutional ownership. Second, we 
examine whether the lower level of institutional ownership is due to the existence of a large block 
of family ownership (crowding out effect) or the avoidance of family controlled businesses by 
some of the institutional investors. Third, we examine whether family controlled businesses have 
a lower level of concentrated institutional ownership. Forth, we examine whether small 
institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses. 
Fernando et al. (2014) argued that institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses 
because of the type 2 agency problem, while Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that family 
controlled businesses perform better and run more efficiently than non-family controlled 
businesses. Anderson and Reeb (2003) concluded that the idea of minority shareholders being 
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adversely affected by family ownership is inconsistent with the superior performance and 
efficiency of family controlled businesses. This also suggests that type 2 agency problems are not 
the only reason for institutional investor to avoid family controlled businesses. To find a reason 
for the institutional investors’ avoidance of family controlled businesses, we look into concentrated 
institutional ownership. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) first used a similar term to represent the 
ownership of major institutional investors, and claimed that concentrated institutional ownership 
measures institutional investors’ influence on management. We believe institutional investors’ 
inability to control management in a family controlled business, will result in lower level of 
concentrated institutional ownership. Coffee (1991) and Gillan and Starks (2000) argue that 
institutional investors have greater incentive to monitor as they can not always sell the shares of 
the underperforming firms. Moreover, institutional investors are also more likely to get involved 
in corporate management than non-institutional investors due to their high ownership stake 
(Brickley et al., 1988). However, in family controlled firms, the founding family exercises 
considerable influence over management, which prevents institutional investors from having an 
impact on management decisions. Thus, being unable to influence management, institutional 
investors avoid family controlled businesses. Another possible reason for institutional investors to 
avoid family controlled businesses could be the existence of type 2 agency problems (insider 
majority shareholders extract private benefit at the expense of minority shareholders). To 
investigate this argument, we look into the ownership of small institutional investors (institutional 
investor that does not belong to a firm’s largest ten institutional holders and does not have more 
than 5% ownership in that firm). Most of the small institutional investors are small holders and do 
not have any intention to influence management. Therefore, their investment decision should not 
be affected by ownership structure. However, a low institutional ownership stake might indicate 
that family controlled businesses suffer from type 2 agency problems. It is possible that 
institutional investors are avoiding family controlled businesses because of the fear of type 2 
agency problems, rather than due to the existence of it.  
To investigate the research questions, we used a matched sample approach. We created two groups 
with similar criteria. One group consists of the family controlled businesses and the other consists 
of the same number of non-family controlled businesses. We followed a method originally used 
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) to create two groups using propensity score matching. This 
approach allows us to see if two firms with similar criteria other than family and non-family 
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controlled, attract the same number of institutional investors. We considered most of the factors 
institutional investors consider when investing, such as size, profitability, dividend payments, 
growth prospects, and leverage. We find robust evidence to support our argument that, ceteris 
paribus, institutional investors will either avoid family controlled businesses or invest less in 
family controlled businesses than in non-family controlled businesses.  
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
 
Institutional investors have been the major provider of capital in the United States over the past 
few decades. Due to a high concentration of ownership they enjoy some privileges over retail 
investors. The privileges include better access to information (Boehmer and Kelly, 2009), ability 
to influence management decision making (Brickley et al., 1988), and terminating managers if 
their performance is not satisfactory (Aggarwal, 2010). However, due to high ownership, it is not 
easy for them to have an exit policy. As institutional holdings get larger, institutional investors 
will avoid an exit option and become long-term holders (Coffee, 1991). Therefore, they have more 
incentive to get engaged in management and prevent any policy that might adversely affect the 
value of the firm (Brickley et al., 1988).  
Institutional investors also play a great role in monitoring performance and reducing agency costs. 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) suggest that institutional investors serve a monitoring role in mitigating 
the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Moreover, Demiralp at el. (2011) 
emphasize that institutional investors have informational advantages, which help them to focus on 
their monitoring duties. Jensen and Meckling (1976), in their seminal paper on agency problems 
and ownership structure, explained outside equity holders can reduce agency costs by monitoring 
and other control activities like auditing, formal control system, budget restrictions and 
establishment of an incentive compensation system. Institutional ownership has been found to 
improve corporate disclosure practices (Bushee and Noe, 2000) and higher institutional ownership 
puts more weight on an incentive compensation system rather than a fixed salary for management 
to ensure better performance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). However, Bushee (1988) put forward an 
idea that different institutions might have different agendas. He classified institutional investors 
into three major groups based on their investment activity. He found that dedicated investors and 
quasi indexers, who invest for the long term, have significant influence on management and 
influence its decision to meet their own long-term goals.  
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However, the role of institutional investors in improving any form of performance has been a 
matter of debate. McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Clay (2001) found empirical evidence that 
institutional investors improve firm performance and market valuations. Han and Suk (1998) found 
that stock returns are positively related to institutional ownership. But, Charfeddine and 
Elmarzougui (2010) investigated France’s capital market and found little evidence to support the 
relationship between firm performance and institutional ownership. Nevertheless, most of the 
literature associates institutional ownership with better operating performance and market 
valuation. 
Family controlled businesses have a unique structure. Family controlled businesses start capital 
accumulation from family members, but as they expand, they look for additional capital from 
external sources.  Another feature of family controlled businesses is their tendency to use special 
class shares in order to maintain sufficient ownership or voting rights to retain control over the 
firm. Major shareholders, like founding family members, do not merely monitor management 
teams, they lead them (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). In the United States, where most of the 
family controlled businesses are widely held (Morck and Yeung, 2003), this practice raises concern 
that management actions might favor controlling family’s interest over that of minority 
shareholders. 
There are two main factors that might explain the lower institutional investor participation in 
family controlled businesses. First, a high level of family ownership prevents institutional 
investors from investing in family controlled businesses. Second, institutional investors may avoid 
family controlled businesses. Institutional investors prefer large firms with high liquidity (Gomper 
and Metrick, 2001). For institutional investors looking for liquidity, taking large control positions 
is unattractive (Coffee, 1991). High family ownership removes a significant portion of the market 
shares, which in turn reduces liquidity. Reviewing the past literature, we have found two possible 
reasons to explain why institutional investors might avoid family controlled businesses: 1) 
Concern that they won’t have control over management; 2) Controlling families might take 
advantage of their position and influence management for their private gain. We will discuss each 
rational in following paragraphs. 
The first argument for institutional investors’ avoidance of family controlled firms is institutional 
investors’ inability to influence management. Brickley et al. (1988), Coffee (1991), and Gillan and 
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Starks (1999) argue that institutional investors have incentives to monitor and influence 
management. The literature finds robust evidence of institutional investors’ influence on 
management (Brickley et al., 1988, Bushee, 1998, Bushee and Noe, 2001, Hartzell and Starks, 
2003, and Aggarwal, 2010). Therefore, institutional investors will avoid firms where they can’t 
influence management. However, each institutional investor has different priorities, thus 
institutional investors do not always invest in a firm to influence management. Pound (1988) put 
forward three hypotheses to describe the roles of institutional investors. First the “efficient 
monitoring” hypothesis. It says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor 
management at lower cost than small shareholders. The “conflict of interest” hypothesis, suggests 
that in view of other profitable business relationships with the firm, institutional investors are 
coerced into voting their shares with management. The third hypothesis is the “strategic-alignment” 
hypothesis. It holds that the institutional owner and the managers will find it mutually 
advantageous to co-operate. Brickley et al. (1988) found that banks, insurance companies, and 
trusts, frequently derive benefits under existing management, thus are less likely to oppose 
management than mutual funds, foundations, and public-employee pension funds, which support 
Pound’s (1988) second and third hypotheses. These three hypotheses indicate that different 
institutional investors will have different priorities. Among these three hypotheses, the “efficient 
monitoring” hypothesis has been widely studied and compelling evidence has been found in favor 
of it.  
Gillan and Starks (1999) find that institutional investors with a large stake in the firm have a strong 
incentive to take a monitoring role as the substantial increase in return is sufficient to cover the 
monitoring costs. Further, Hartzell and Starks (2001) find that institutional investors make 
management’s compensation more sensitive to performance to ensure strong operating 
performance. Brickley et al. (1988), Coffee (1991), and Aggarwal (2010) have drawn similar 
conclusions about an institutional investor’s role. Bushee (1998) took a different approach to 
differentiate institutional investors based on their investment patterns and tried to determine 
whether his classification would determine the priorities of each group. He classified institutional 
investors into three distinct groups: dedicated investors, quasi-indexers, and transient investors. 
Dedicated investors and quasi-indexers are long term investors who follow a buy and hold policy, 
and transient investors are short term traders. He found that dedicated investors and quasi-indexers 
are sophisticated investors, who have noteworthy influence over management and invest for 
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growth and performance. On the other hand, transient investors do not concern themselves with 
management action, they are more concerned about liquidity and short-term gain. Thus, it is 
evident that some, but not all, institutional investors have incentive and resources to influence 
management. 
Our second argument to explain lower institutional ownership in family controlled firms is based 
on the fear of type 2 agency problems. As ownership and management get separated, managers 
and owners will have conflicting interests and information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Furthermore, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the more concentrated the ownership the 
less serious the agency problem. Villalonga and Amit (2006) put forward the idea of another form 
of agency problem: Large inside shareholders will extract benefits using their controlling position 
at the expense of the minority shareholder (type 2 agency problem). Fernando et al. (2014), argue 
that family controlled businesses suffer from type 2 agency problems, thus sophisticated investors, 
like institutional investors, avoid family controlled businesses. Bhaumik and Gregoriou (2010) 
also discuss type 2 agency problems. Morck and Yeung (2003) raised similar concerns that with 
the existence of large family holdings, when most of the shares are widely held, professional 
managers may fail in their fiduciary duty to act for public shareholders. On the other hand, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) concluded that family ownership does not adversely affect the minority 
shareholders and claimed that family controlled businesses perform better than their non-family 
counterparts. Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) findings are in contrast with the later works of Bhaumik 
and Gregoriou (2010), and Fernando et al. (2014). Bhaumik and Gregoriou`s (2010) extensive 
review of the literature found world-wide evidence of type 2 agency problems through transferring 
of assets, hiding losses, and fraud cover-ups. Thus, type 2 agency problems exist and can be a valid 
argument to explain why institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses. 
Past literature suggests these motivations to explain why institutional investors might favor a non-
family controlled over a family controlled business. It is hard to determine a single reason for this 
behavior; however, it is evident that, regardless of the reason, institutional investors prefer non-
family controlled over family controlled businesses. 
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Chapter 3 
 Theoretical Argument and Hypotheses 
 
Based on our literature review, we found that institutional investors prefer to have control over 
management. However, the unique structure of family controlled businesses may prevent anyone 
from influencing management except family members. This should discourage institutional 
investors from investing in family controlled businesses. Moreover, there is a possibility that type 
2 agency problems exist. Existence of type 2 agency problems will also deter the institutional 
investors from investing in family controlled businesses. Furthermore, a substantial family 
ownership shares may present a limited ownership opportunity to the institutional investors (the 
crowding out effect). Hence, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus family controlled business will have a lower level of institutional 
ownership. 
Our first hypothesis tests only whether the family controlled businesses have less institutional 
ownership. It does not tell us whether the lower institutional ownership is due to institutional 
investors’ avoidance of family controlled firms or the crowding out effect of family ownership. To 
distinguish whether institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses or if they are being 
crowded out, we put forward the following two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2A: A portion of the reduction in institutional ownership is due to a crowding out effect 
as concentrated ownership by the controlling family prevents institutional investors from investing 
in family controlled businesses. 
Hypothesis 2B: After controlling for the crowding out effect, there will still be lower institutional 
ownership in family controlled businesses, indicating that institutional investors avoid family 
controlled businesses. 
Major investors usually have incentives and resources to monitor management. However, the 
existence of a large block of family owners will discourage institutional investors that wish to 
influence managerial decision making. Therefore, concentrated ownership (ownership of the 
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largest five institutional investors within a firm) will be less in family controlled businesses. Hence, 
our next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, relative to a non-family controlled, a family controlled business 
will have a lower level of concentrated institutional ownership, because the inability to control 
management discourages institutional investors from investing in family controlled businesses. 
Investors with a large ownership stake invest for the long term and have incentives to influence 
management (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). However, small institutional investors (institutional 
investors that do not fall into the largest ten institutional investor group in a firm and do not have 
ownership over 5%) focus on firm performance. In other words, ownership structure should not 
influence the investment decision of a small institutional investor. Therefore, ceteris paribus both 
family controlled and non-family controlled firms should have similar small institutional 
ownership holdings. On the other hand, a family controlled or strongly family influenced 
management may act on behalf of the controlling family rather than in the best interests of the 
shareholders in general. This scenario will give rise to type 2 agency problems, and lead small 
institutional investors to avoid family controlled businesses. Hence, our fourth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, type 2 agency problems will discourage small institutional 
investors from investing in family controlled businesses. 
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Chapter 4 
 Data Sources and Research Methodology 
 
4.1: Data Sources 
The institutional holdings data is the end of quarter total institutional stock holdings for 45 family 
controlled and 142 non-family controlled US businesses between 2010 and 2015 inclusive. We 
have selected the family controlled firms from the list provided by the University of St.Gallen 
(2015) and the non-family controlled businesses using propensity score matching. Propensity score 
matching will be discussed in detail in the next section. The matches are done on a year by year 
basis so that the matched firms change over time. If dual class shares exist in a family controlled 
business, we considered only the common share class and excluded the special or voting shares 
class, as most of these are not available to outside shareholders. Our institutional ownership data 
is collected from Thompson Reuters T13 Institutional Holding database. The Thompson Reuters 
T13 Institutional Holding database includes institutional investors who submit F-13 to the Security 
and Exchange Commission and these institutional investors have portfolios worth more than 100 
million US dollars. In this paper, we classify top five and top ten investors, within a firm, as large 
investors, and we classify the rest of the investors as small investors. Financial statement data is 
from Compustat, and stock market index and trading volume data is from CRSP. T-bill rates (90 
days) are from the Federal Reserve System database. Finally, we collected the family ownership 
data from the proxy statements submitted to the Security and Exchange Commission each year 
from 2010 to 2015 inclusive. We have also created a second subset for the family controlled firms 
with dual class shares and their matches. 
Variable Descriptions: 
Table 4.1 provides a list of the variables used in this study, the sources of the data used in 
calculating the variables, and the formula for calculating each variable if the variable is not 
provided by the database. The following paragraphs provide details from Table 4.1. 
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝟒. 𝟏 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 
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Total Institutional Ownership (TIO): Our first dependent variable is total institutional ownership. 
It is provided by the Thompson Reuters T13 database. This variable is created by dividing the total 
number of shares held by the institutions by the total number of shares outstanding. Bushee (1998), 
Fernando et al. (2014), Grinstein et al. (2005) and many previous studies used this variable as a 
dependent variable to represent institutional investors’ ownership in a firm. 
Top Five Ownership (1T5): Like the institutional ownership, this firm-specific variable is created 
by dividing the shares held by the top five institutional investors, by the total numbers of share 
outstanding. The number is expressed as a percentage to represent the ownership of the top five 
institutions in the business. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) argued that this variable represents 
concentration of holdings and reflects the institutions’ ability to monitor and affect boards 
decisions.  
Six to Ten Ownership (6T10): This firm-specific variable is calculated by dividing the number of 
shares held by the sixth to tenth ranked institutional investors in a firm by the total number of 
shares outstanding. The idea behind using this variable is same as the prior one: It allows us to 
study whether the inability to control management affects the next sixth to tenth investors in the 
same way it affects the top five institutional investors. 
Small institutional ownership (SIO): Small institutional ownership is created by dividing the shares 
held by small institutional investors by the total number of shares outstanding. We define small 
institutional investors as institutional investors that do not fall into the top ten investor category 
and have less than 5% institutional ownership. Smaller institutional investors don’t have any 
incentive or the ability to control management. Therefore, lower level of small institutional 
ownership might indicate that some institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses due 
to type 2 agency problems. 
Retail ownership (RO): We created retail ownership by dividing the shares held by retail investors 
by the total number of shares outstanding. In this paper, retail investors are individual investors or 
institutional investors with less than 100 million dollars in their portfolio. Fernando et al. (2014) 
argued that if institutional investors are investing less in family controlled businesses, retail 
investors should be holding more.  
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Family Controlled Businesses (FC): This is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is family 
controlled. According to the list of family controlled businesses created by the University of 
St.Gallen in 2015. They defined family controlled businesses as follows “for a publicly listed firm, 
a firm is classified as a family firm in case the family holds at least 32% of the voting rights." They 
used 32% as their cut off value because in OECD countries, on average, 30% of the votes are 
sufficient to dominate the general assembly of a publicly listed company. The St.Gallen list is the 
top 500 family controlled businesses based on revenue. From that list, we found 45 firms, which 
are publicly traded and have their main operation in the USA. We confine our research to the USA 
as the Thomson Reuter database is confined to the US market. 
Percentage Family Ownership (PFO): Percentage family ownership is calculated by dividing the 
number of shares held by family members by the number of shares outstanding. Our data set 
contains only common class shares, therefore ownership in special class or voting class shares 
does not impact our percentage family ownership and therefore does not represent the voting 
power of the controlling family.  
Dual class dummy (DD): Dual class dummy indicates whether a family controlled business has 
dual class shares. The dual class dummy is 1 if a firm is family controlled and has dual class shares 
and zero otherwise.  
Control variables: We include control variables to capture previously documented determinants of 
institutional ownership. Gompers and Metrick (2001) found that size positively affects institutional 
investors’ decisions. Ferreira and Matos (2007) found that operating performance, debt to asset, 
firm valuation, beta, liquidity and S&P 500 dummy is positively correlated with institutional 
ownership. Michaely (2005) found that institutional investors prefer firms with a moderate level 
of payout and Bathala et al. (1994) found that the level of debt negatively affects institutional 
ownership. Moreover, institutional investors are concerned about liquidity and sales revenue 
(Bushee, 2001), and prefer firms with a higher book to market ratio (Gompers and Metrick, 1998). 
In addition to firm specific variables, we included market condition and borrowing cost variables 
to represent the investment environment. We use the log of total assets as a proxy for size 
(Charfeddine and Elmarzougui, 2010), return on assets as a measure of profitability (Charfeddine 
and Elmarzougui, 2010), and debt to asset as a measure of leverage (Bushee et al, 2000). We also 
used capital expenditure (Bushee, 1998), payout (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005) and sales turnover 
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(Grinstein and Michaely, 2005) as control variables. We also included Tobin’s Q (Bushee, 1998) 
to capture market valuation (market to book ratio), share volume to represent liquidity (Bushee, 
2001) and beta to proxy risk (Fernando et al, 2014). Finally, the return on S&P 500 and the T-bill 
rate measure market conditions and borrowing costs, respectively. 
4.2: Propensity Score Matching 
Propensity score matching is a statistical method to create a set of observations which best matches, 
based on some predetermined criteria, our treated group. The propensity score approach runs a 
Probit or a Logit regression on the predetermined criteria to find a score for each observation of 
the treated group; then it selects one or multiple observations from the control group based on a 
matched score. The selected observations will have the score closest to the score of the treated 
group. In other words, the selected observations will have similar characteristics as the treated 
group, but the new group will lack the treatment. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) introduced this 
method to create a controlled group for their study. 
In this study, we examine and compare two groups: the family controlled group and non-family 
controlled group. To ensure that two groups have the same number of companies each year and 
for each industry we used nearest neighbor matching without replacement. The family controlled 
group is the top 45 family controlled businesses, by revenue and traded publicly in the USA 
according to the list created by the University of St.Gallen. The non-family controlled group is 
also traded in the US market. In our propensity score matching we used the most common factors 
institutional investors consider when investing in a firm. Gompers and Metrick (2001) found that 
from 1980 to 1996 institutional investors increased demand for large companies and decreased 
demand for small companies. Ferreira and Matos (2007) found that operating performance and 
capital expenditure affects institutional ownership. Moreover, institutional investors prefer firms 
with a moderate level of payout (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005) and avoid firms with high debt 
level (Bathala et al., 1994). Furthermore, Bushee (1998) found that institutional investors prefer 
firms with higher research and development expenditures. Therefore, for our propensity score 
matching we used size (ln (total asset)), profitability (return on assets), leverage (debt to total asset), 
payout (cash dividend to total asset), and capital expenditure (capital expenditure to total asset). 
Unfortunately, we had to drop research and development as only 21 out of the 45 family controlled 
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firms in our sample, had research and development data. The following equation presents the 
model for our propensity score matching.  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖) = 𝛽1𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 … … … . (4.1) 
 
Table 4.2 describes variables used in the Probit regression while Table 4.3 presents the Probit 
regression estimates for the propensity score matching.  
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝟒. 𝟐 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝟒. 𝟑 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 
In general, a limitation of propensity score matching is that it is cross sectional analysis, so it is 
confined within one specific period of time. However, our data set is from 2010 to 2015, therefore, 
we matched for each year separately. This allows the matches to vary annually. Nearest neighbor 
matching will give the best match for that year, so if there is difference between institutional 
ownership within that year, it will be due to the nature of the firms. In other words, whether a firm 
is family controlled or not will solely determine the differences in the institutional ownership.  
We used annual data from Compustat to avoid seasonality and for simplicity. We started with two 
groups: one group consists of 45 family controlled companies, the treated group, and the other 
group consists of all the other publicly traded companies that do not fall into our family controlled 
businesses category and don’t have any missing data. We also confine our matching pool to those 
firms with more than 1 million dollars in total assets to avoid noise from small companies. Further, 
one of the pre-conditions of the match is that the firms must be in the same industry and same year. 
If we do not find a match for a family controlled firm within the industry for a year, the firm is 
dropped for that year. Before the matching the number of untreated firms was slightly less than 
four thousand each year. However, after the matching scores, we had 45 family controlled 
businesses and only 142 non-family controlled businesses. 
4.3: Testing for propensity score matching 
Propensity score matching uses given criteria to find the best match for the treated variables from 
the non-treated sample. One of the ways to assess the success of propensity score matching is to 
do a t-test on the difference in the means of the factors before and after matching. Table 4.4 
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presents the differences in means by year, of ASizeit, AROAit, ADAit, APOit and ACXit, before 
and after the matching. The differences between family and non-family groups decreases as the 
family controlled group is matched with the same number of non-family controlled businesses. 
The most noticeable change is in the differences of the mean values of ASize, the range of 
differences decreases from 3.15 to 3.44 pre-match to -.0897 to .015 post-match. Moreover, the t-
values become insignificant after the data is matched. The means of AROA also become 
insignificantly different after matching. The means of ADA, APO and ACX change slightly. APO 
in 2010, 2012 and 2015, and ADA in 2013 increase noticeably, when the two groups are matched. 
These increases are expected because propensity score matching uses five factors to determine the 
best match. In order to select the best match, it will select an observation, which fits best 
considering all five factors. For example, to get a better match for size, the algorithm might select 
a firm which might not be the best match for leverage.  However, the increases are not a concern 
as the highest t-value in the entire matched dataset is 1.86, which is within the 5% cut-off. 
Furthermore, the standard deviations of the differences decrease quite noticeably, indicating that 
we have a more consistent and reliable dataset after matching. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
propensity score matching has given us two matched groups that meet our expectations and do not 
raise any concerns about the reliability of the process. 
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝟒. 𝟒 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 
The ultimate test for the propensity score matching is to show that the two groups are equally 
desirable from an investment point of view. Therefore, a test of the effectiveness of the propensity 
score matching is to investigate the difference in the investment performance of the matched 
groups over the 5-year period of the study. If the investment performance is similar, we can claim 
that the propensity score matching is effective in finding pairs whose ownership structure is 
irrelevant from an investment point of view. The investment performance tests and results of these 
tests are presented in this section.  
To implement this test we created two portfolios, one consisting of only family controlled 
businesses and the other consisting of non-family businesses. We considered our matched firms 
from each year, and created the portfolio using those matched firms at the beginning of the next 
year. We created an equally weighted portfolio, therefore each firm has the same weight as its 
match in the portfolio. The purpose of this part of our study is to compare the performance of a 
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portfolio consisting of only family controlled businesses, with the performance of a matched non-
family business portfolio. 
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝟒. 𝟓 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 
From panel A of Table 4.5 and graphs 4.1 and 4.2, we can see that both portfolios have similar 
return patterns. There are some noticeable differences in the second quarter of 2012. The family 
portfolio had a higher value than the non-family portfolio in May 2012. The family businesses 
portfolio value was significantly higher than the value of non-family businesses portfolio until 
December 2014. In January 2015, the value of the non-family business portfolio exceeded the 
value of the family business portfolio. However, after that, the family portfolio started out-
performing the non-family portfolio. In December 2015, the value of the family businesses 
portfolio was approximately 13% higher than the non-family businesses portfolio.  
Panel B of Table 4.5 presents the test of difference of means of the return of the portfolio. The t-
value is 0.1621 and p-value is 0.8715. This indicates that the returns were not statistically 
significant, even though the family business portfolio generated 13% more value than the non-
family portfolio. These results help us to draw several conclusions. Our two portfolios are not only 
similar with respect to the five factors we used in our propensity score matching, but also similar 
in terms of market performance of the subsequent years.  
4.4: Research Methodology 
We followed two approaches to test the first hypothesis that total institutional ownership (TIO) is 
less in family controlled relative to non-family controlled businesses. The first approach tests the 
difference in the means of TIO. If the mean of TIO is different across groups, family control should 
be the only factor responsible for the gap. The same intuition applies to difference in means tests 
of any of the other dependent variables (top five institutional investors’ ownership (1T5), sixth to 
tenth institutional investors’ ownership (6T10) and small institutional ownership (SIO)).  
The second approach to test the first hypothesis involves estimating cross-sectional regressions to 
see the impact of family control on each of the four dependent variables. Even though propensity 
score matching gives us the best possible match for our treated group, in practice it is not possible 
to get a perfect match for all the firms. In other words, even with the best match, the two groups 
will have minor differences regarding size, profitability, leverage, payout and capital expenditure. 
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Multivariate analysis will allow us to control the effect of those characteristics and observe the 
impact of the family control on institutional ownership independent of firm characteristics.  
Models for Regression Analysis: 
Hypothesis 1 examines the relationship between institutional ownership and family controlled 
businesses. Model 4.2 compares the level of total institutional ownership between family 
controlled and non-family controlled businesses and thus is used to test Hypothesis 1. 
Hypotheses 2A and 2B investigate whether the lower level of total institutional ownership is due 
to a lack of available shares (crowding out effect) or if institutional investors are avoiding family 
controlled businesses. To investigate these hypotheses, we use model 4.3, which includes 
percentage family ownership, model 4.4 uses a dual class dummy and model 4.5 incorporates 
both. These models allow us to examine the impact of family control on institutional ownership 
after controlling for the crowding out effect and various other factors. 
𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + B7𝑆𝑇it +
𝐵8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵9𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵11𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵13𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  ………………………………………………………………………………….(4.2)  
𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑃𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵7𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
B8𝑆𝑇it + 𝐵9𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵11𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵13𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵14𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 +
𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 …………………………………………………………………(4.3) 
𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝐵3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵7𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
B8𝑆𝑇it + 𝐵9𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵11𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵13𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵14𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 +
𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 …………………………………………………………………(4.4) 
𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑃𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝐵4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵7𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
B8𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵9S𝑇it + 𝐵10𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵11𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 +  𝐵12𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵13𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵14𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵15𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 +
𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ……………………………… ………………………………(4.5)  
Hypothesis 3 examines the relationship between the top institutional owners and family 
controlled businesses. Large institutional investors invest in a firm for the long term and they 
have an incentive to monitor and control management (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005).  Thus, the 
inability to influence management will deter large institutional investors from investing in family 
controlled businesses. To observe this avoidance effect without confounding it with crowding 
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out, we use the group with dual class shares only. Family members in family controlled firms 
tend to hold the firm’s special class shares, if they are available, rather than common shares and 
therefore institutional investors are not being crowded out. Model 4.6 and 4.7 focus on the top 
five and the sixth to tenth institutional investors, respectively. Intuitively, if major institutional 
investors avoid family controlled business in our dual share subsample, it is because the inability 
to control management is a deterrent. We do not simultaneously include family ownership and 
percentage family ownership in the models because these two variables lead to multicollinearity.  
1𝑇5𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + B7𝑆𝑇it +
𝐵8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵9𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵11𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵13𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. …………………………………………………………………………………(4.6) 
6𝑇10𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + B7𝑆𝑇it +
𝐵8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵9𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵11𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵13𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. …………………………………………………………………………………(4.7) 
Model 4.8 is used to test whether family controlled businesses have a lower level of ownership 
by small institutional investors relative to non-family controlled businesses (Hypothesis 4). We 
define small institutional investors as institutional investors that do not have ownership 
exceeding 5% and they are not one of the major ten institutional investors in a firm. In our 
dataset, most of the institutional investors are small institutional investors with no motivation to 
control management. Therefore, lower small institutional ownership will indicate that small 
institutional investors, who do not get involved in management, avoid family controlled business 
due to the fear of type 2 agency problems. We also confined this test to the group with dual class 
shares to avoid the influence of the crowding out effect. Hence our model is: 
𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + B7𝑆𝑇it +
𝐵8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵9𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵11𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵13𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …(4.8) 
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Chapter 5 
Summary statistics and Results 
 
5.1: Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, our control variables and 
the three dummy variables. We have four different dependent variables: 1) total institutional 
ownership (TIO), 2) total ownership of the top five institutional investors (1T5), 3) total 
ownership of sixth to tenth ranked institutional investors (6T10) and 4) total ownership of small 
institutional investors (SIO) that reported F-13 institutional holdings to SEC. Size, return on 
assets (ROA), debt to assets (DA), pay out (PO), capital expenditure (CX), sales turnover 
(ST),Tobin’s Q (TobQ), liquidity or share volume (LIQ) and Beta are firm specific variables 
used as controls. We added the S&P 500 (S&P) index and T-bill rates (int) to represent market 
conditions and borrowing costs, respectively. Good market conditions have a positive correlation 
with investment and a high borrowing cost should have a negative correlation with investment. 
Finally, FC is a family control dummy variable to represent family controlled firms, DD is a 
dummy variable for dual class shares and S&PCo is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm 
is included in the S&P500.  
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝟓. 𝟏 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 
 
In panel A of Table 5.1, total institutional ownership (TIO) ranges from .11% to 99.7% with an 
average of 62.25%. Institutional ownership over 100% and their matches were dropped. WRDS, 
and Thompson Reuters are aware of this data issue. Although they could not provide a definite 
explanation for this anomaly, they suspect it could be due to short selling. Unfortunately, they do 
not have short selling data for institutions and individuals, so they could not make any 
adjustments. Nevertheless, Thomson Reuters assured us that they take extensive care to avoid 
double counting. As this dataset is the most reliable and widely used in the literature, we decided 
to use it for our research. The top five institutional (1T5) and the top six to ten institutional 
investors (6T10) own on average 25.28% and 9.3% respectively, which represents a substantial 
share in a firm. The mean ownership of the small institutional investors (SIO) is 28.42% with a 
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range from 0 to 56%. The median values of the four dependent variables are close to their 
respective means, indicating that skewness in not a problem.   
In Panel B, the family control (FC) dummy indicates whether a firm is family controlled or not. 
The mean and median of the family dummy is .5 because we have the same number of family 
controlled and non-family controlled businesses in our sample. Size, ROA, DA, PO, CX, TobQ, 
ST and LIQ variables do not show any abnormalities that raise concerns about the dataset. 
Moreover, except for capital expenditure (CX), none of the firm specific variables are skewed. 
Furthermore, the range of these variables are within reasonable limits. This helps us conclude 
that extremes or outliers are not an issue in our sample. 
5.2: Univariate test 
Table 5.2 presents the correlation matrix between institutional holdings, family ownership and all 
the control variables.  The results demonstrate that total institutional ownership (TIO), top five 
institutional investor’s ownership (5T10), six to ten institutional ownership (6T10), small 
institutional ownership (SIO) and retail ownership (RO) are significantly negatively correlated 
with the family control dummy and family ownership. This indicates that institutional and retail 
holdings decrease when the firm in question is a family controlled firm. Institutional ownership 
is also negative and significantly correlated with size, payout (PO), and capital expenditure (CX), 
but positive and significantly correlated with debt to asset (DA), liquidity (LIQ) and the S&P 500 
dummy (S&PCo). A moderate level of debt encourages institutional investors to invest (Bathala 
et al., 1994) and institutional investor always prefer more liquid shares (Bushee, 1998). Thus, we 
expect and observe positive correlations between TIO and DA, and TIO and LIQ. The negative 
correlation between institutional ownership and size is expected, as institutions need more funds 
to have a strong presence in a larger firm than in a smaller one. But the negative correlation with 
payout is somewhat surprising because institutional investors tend to prefer a moderate payout 
level (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). The correlations between institutional ownership and 
ROA, TobQ, Beta and ST are not significant. Past literature supports both positive (Clay, 2001) 
and negative (Gompers and Metrick, 1998) correlations between institutional ownership and 
Tobin’s Q.  
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝟓. 𝟐 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 
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The top five institutional investors’ ownership (1T5) is also negatively correlated with size, 
ROA, payout (PO), capital expenditure (CX), sales turnover (ST), S&P 500 constitute (S&PCo) 
and Tobin’Q (TobQ), but positively related to debt to asset (DA) and liquidity (LIQ). Moreover, 
six to ten institutional ownership (6T10) is also significantly negatively correlated with size and 
payout (PO), but positively correlated with debt to asset (DA) and liquidity (LIQ). On the other 
hand, the relationships between 6T10 and, ROA, capital expenditure (CX), sales turnover (ST) 
and Tobin’s Q (TobQ), Beta, S&PCo and S&P are not significant. The relationships between 
small institutional ownership (SIO) and size, payout (PO), capital expenditure (CX), and sales 
turnover (ST) and Beta are not significant. Liquidity (LIQ), ROA, debt to asset (DA), Tobin’s Q 
(TobQ), S&PCo, S&P and Int are significantly positively related to small institutional 
ownership.  These correlations show that major institutional investors have different priorities 
relative to the small investors with respect to most of the firm specific variables.  
The family control dummy has insignificant relationships with each of the variables used in 
propensity score matching (size, ROA, DA, PO, CX). The lack of significant correlations is an 
indication that our propensity score matching has achieved its goal: Creation of a sample where 
the family controlled businesses will not significantly differ from non-family controlled 
businesses with respect to these five variables. The family control dummy is negatively 
correlated with Tobin’s Q (TobQ), liquidity (LIQ), and the S&P 500 dummy. The negative 
correlation with share volume (LIQ) is expected because as the controlling family holds a huge 
portion of the ownership, fewer shares are available. The negative relationship between Tobin’s 
Q and family control dummy is weak but significant. The family control dummy (FC) does not 
have any significant relationships with any other explanatory variable. 
The largest correlation among the control variables is between the family control and dual class 
dummy variables (.588). The family control dummy is also correlated (.492) with family 
ownership (second strongest correlation). This raises the possibility of multicollinearity in the 
multivariate analysis. For robustness, we estimated the models using these three variables 
separately and jointly.  
Among the explanatory variables, the third highest positive correlation is between ROA and 
Tobin’s Q (.457), and the highest negative correlation is between liquidity (LIQ) and percentage 
family ownership (PFO) (-.317). ROA and Tobin’s Q are correlated because a higher return 
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indicates better performance, which in turn results in higher market valuation. On the other hand, 
a higher percentage family ownership (PFO) indicates that less shares will be available to be 
traded in the market, resulting in lower liquidity (LIQ).  None of the other correlations among the 
right-hand side variables suggest that multicollinearity will be a problem in the multivariate 
analysis. 
We tested the difference in the means of each variable across the family and non-family groups. 
The tests were done assuming equal and unequal variances but the results are the same, so we 
present only one set of outcomes. Table 5.3 presents the results for each characteristic across the 
family and non-family groups from 2010 to 2015 inclusive. In panel 1A and 1B we test the 
difference in the means of our four dependent variables and in panel 2A and 2B we test the 
difference in the means of firm specific characteristics. Panel 3A and 3B focuses on a dual class 
share sub sample. The tests are done on a yearly basis because there are different matches each 
year. 
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝟓. 𝟑 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 
In the Panel 1A and 1B we tested the difference between mean values of institutional ownership 
(TIO), mean of top five institutional investors’ ownership (1T5), mean of sixth to tenth 
institutional investors’ ownership (6T10), and mean of the small institutional ownership (SIO) 
across family and non-family firms. The results illustrate that family controlled businesses have 
experienced average total institutional ownership (TIO) ranging from 51% (2011) to 60% 
(2013), on the other hand the non-family controlled businesses have average institutional 
ownership varying from 63.5% (2014) to 79% (2010). The difference between the institutional 
ownership of family and non-family controlled groups ranges between 8% (2015) to 26% (2010) 
over the six-year period. Within each year, the difference is always positively statistically 
significant. This provides strong support for the first hypothesis that institutional ownership is 
less when it comes to family controlled businesses. Moreover, when we consider the top five 
(1T5) and the sixth to tenth institutional investors’ (6T10) ownership, the difference is between 
2% (2013) to 7% (2010) for top five institutional investors’ ownership and between 0.7% (2015) 
to 4% (2010) for the sixth to tenth institutional investors’ ownership. The total institutional 
ownership, top five ownership, sixth to tenth institutional ownership and small institutional 
ownership are significantly higher for non-family controlled businesses, except for the sixth to 
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tenth institutional ownership in year 2015.  Large investors tend to want significant control over 
management and they have an interest in long term investment (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). 
Therefore, observing lower levels of concentrated institutional ownership in family firms 
suggests that institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses due to the inability to 
control management. Finally, the results also show that small institutional ownership is 
significantly less in family versus non-family controlled businesses. These small investors have 
neither the capacity nor the intention to influence management and they invest based on the 
firm’s financial performance. Given that the firms in the two groups are matched based on size, 
profitability, leverage, payout and capital expenditure, they should have almost the same levels 
of small institutional ownership. The discrepancy reflects the small institutional investors lack of 
trust in the management of family controlled firms (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). This is also 
consistent with Fernando et al. (2014): Family controlled firms might suffer from type 2 agency 
problems and institutional investors, being sophisticated investors, therefore avoid family 
controlled businesses.  
In panel 2A and 2B we tested the differences in means between family and non-family controlled 
businesses for the firm specific variables. None of the five variables used in the propensity score 
matching was significantly different in any of the six years, except payout (PO) in 2013. This 
shows that even though we used yearly data for our propensity score matching, the match is 
consistent for quarterly data. We introduced five additional firm specific control variables to our 
model, sales turnover (ST), Tobin’s Q (TobQ), liquidity (LIQ), beta, and the S&P 500 dummy 
(S&PCo). Among these five control variables, sales turnover (ST) and beta were not 
significantly different in any year across ownership structures, but non-family controlled had 
significantly higher means, relative to the family controlled firms for Tobin’s Q in 2014, 
liquidity in 2010-2011 and 2013 and S&PCo in 2010 and 2012-2014.  These results suggest that, 
in general, the non-family and family controlled firms had similar firm specific characteristics 
except for liquidity and listing on the S&P500 in select years. 
Panel 3A and 3B present the outcomes for the difference in means tests for TIO, 1T5 and SIO 
within the dual class share (and matches) subgroup. TIO and SIO are significantly higher for the 
non-family controlled group from 2010 to 2012, but no statistical difference is found for 2013-
2015. In contrast, 1T5 is significantly larger for the non-family controlled group in only 2013. 
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The evidence suggests that institutional investors interest in family versus non-family controlled 
firms may vary over time and needs to be studied in a more complete setting that considers other 
factors.   
In summary, the univariate tests show that family controlled businesses have less total 
institutional ownership (TIO), top five institutional investors’ ownership (1T5), sixth to tenth of 
institutional ownership (6T10) and small institutional ownership (SIO).  This lower institutional 
ownership concentration can be due to the crowding out effect, institutional investors fear of type 
2 agency problems or recognition of the difficulty of controlling family firm management. We 
turn to multivariate analysis for a deeper understanding of institutional investor’s behavior 
towards family and non-family firms.   
5.3: Multivariate Tests 
The univariate tests illustrated that family controlled businesses, in general, have less TIO, 1T5, 
6T10, and SIO. However, controlling for the effect of firm specific variables and the investment 
environment will allow a deeper understanding of the impact of family control on institutional 
holdings.  
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝟓. 𝟒, 𝟓. 𝟓, 𝟓. 𝟔, 𝟓. 𝟕, 𝟓. 𝟖, 𝟓. 𝟗, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝟓. 𝟏𝟎 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆  
Table 5.4 presents the regression estimates using model 4.2. In Tables 5.4 to 5.10, column 1 
presents the estimates when the five variables used in propensity score matching, the returns on 
the S&P 500 and the interest rate are included as explanatory variables. Column 2 adds sales 
turnover and Tobin’s Q while columns 3 and 4 include liquidity and beta, respectively. Tobin’s 
Q and ROA measure similar concepts and thus are significantly correlated (.457, Table 5.2) so 
we consider them separately, ROA in column 5, Tobin’s Q in column 6, and jointly in column 7. 
The number of family and non-family controlled businesses is the same, in each year and in each 
industry.  
The regression results in Table 5.4 show that the main variable of interest, the family control 
dummy (FC), is significantly negatively correlated with institutional ownership. The coefficient 
indicates that after controlling for other factors, institutional ownership is about 11.5% to 11.7% 
less for family controlled businesses (columns 5 to 7). The control variables have the expected 
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signs and by comparing the coefficients in columns 4 to 7 we can see that multicollinearity does 
not have a significant impact on our results.  
Hypothesis 1 compares the level of total institutional ownership between family and non-family 
control, but it does not provide a rational for this discrepancy. There are two possible reasons for 
lower institutional ownership: First it could be a crowding out effect, in other words because of 
high family ownership, there is not enough room for institutional investors to invest in the family 
controlled business. Second, institutional investors could be avoiding family controlled 
businesses for a variety of reasons. Alternatively, it could be a mixed effect of both. To 
distinguish the crowding out effect from the institutional investors’ avoidance, we tried three 
different models. First, we introduced a percentage family ownership variable, then we included 
a dual class dummy, and finally we used both the percentage family ownership and the dual class 
dummy in our model. 
Table 5.5 presents the regression estimates of model 4.3 which introduces the percentage family 
ownership variable to distinguish between the crowding out and avoidance effects.  The results 
support a significant negative relationship between total institutional ownership (TIO) and 
percentage family ownership (PFO) in all columns. Ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in family 
ownership on average leads to .591% to .595% decrease (columns 5 to 7) in institutional 
ownership. Moreover, after controlling for the percent of family ownership, the family control 
dummy is still negative and significant, albeit the economic significance of the family dummy 
(FC) in columns 5, 6 and 7 has fallen (from the range of 11.5% to 11.7% to the range of 2.9% to 
3.1%). Our control variables had the expected signs and our results do not change significantly 
when we added or removed variables to the regression. Therefore, we can conclude that after 
controlling for the percentage family ownership (PFO), family controlled businesses have 2.9% 
to 3.1% less institutional ownership than non-family controlled businesses. This result indicates 
that the crowding out effect cannot fully explain the reduced level of institutional ownership in 
family controlled businesses  
In model 4.4 and Table 5.6 we control for the crowding out effect by introducing a dual class 
dummy and explore other explanations for the lower institutional ownership in family controlled 
firms relative to non-family firms.  The difference between the coefficients of the family control 
and dual class dummy variables should capture the avoidance effect of institutional investors.  
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From Table 5.6 we can see that family controlled firms without special class shares have 20.5% 
(columns 5 to 7) less institutional ownership compared to non-family controlled businesses, 
ceteris paribus. The dual class dummy (DD) indicates that family controlled businesses with dual 
class shares have approximately 17% more (columns 5 to 7) institutional ownership than family 
controlled businesses without dual class shares. These coefficients are significant at 1%. The 
existence of dual class shares for family firms translates into less family holdings of the firm’s 
common shares and this increased public float reduces the potential for crowding out of 
institutional investors. The difference between the family controlled dummy and the dual class 
dummy (20.5%-17%) indicates that after controlling for crowding out, the family controlled 
businesses still have 3.5% less institutional ownership. We call this the avoidance effect and we 
investigate it in more depth below.   
Table 5.7 presents the regression estimates of model 4.5 where we include both the percentage 
family ownership and the dual class dummy. The smaller coefficient on the family control 
dummy and the insignificance of the dual class dummy is likely the result of multicollinearity as 
DD and PFO are significantly negatively correlated (-.187 in Table 5.2). However, the net results 
are similar to the results of Table 5.5:  Family controlled businesses have 5% less (columns 5 to 
7) total institutional ownership after controlling for percentage family ownership (PFO) and dual 
class dummy (DD).   
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported by the multivariate results reported in Tables 5.4 to 5.7. Thus, 
we believe that institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses for crowding out and 
avoidance reasons. Previous literature supports two rationales to explain institutional investors 
avoidance of family controlled businesses. The first reason is based on the institutional investors 
inability to control family firm management and the second reason is due to type 2 agency 
problems associated with family controlled firms. We investigate these two rationales in models 
4.6 - 4.7 where we control for the crowding out effect by restricting the sample to the firms with 
dual class shares and their matches. In Table 5.8 the dependent variable is ownership of the top 
five institutional investors (1T5). The significant coefficient estimates on FC indicate top five 
institutional investors own 1.7% to 1.9% less (columns 5 to 7) in family controlled than in non-
family controlled business. The top five institutional investors tend to be interested in being 
involved in management of the firm.  The observed lower levels of institutional ownership for 
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this group indicates that the inability to influence management discourages them from investing 
in family controlled businesses. These results support Hypothesis 3’s supposition that 
institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses due to the inability to control 
management.  
We repeat our investigation into the role of management involvement by institutional owners in 
model 4.7, with the ownership of the sixth to tenth investors (6T10) as the dependent variable. In 
this scenario, see Table 5.9, the family control dummy variable is insignificant. Thus, the impact 
of the inability to control management is important for 1T5 but dissipates as institutional 
ownership concentration declines.  
Hypothesis 4 states that small institutional investors should be affected by type 2 agency 
problems. We test for this in model 4.8 by using the dual class share (and their matches) 
subgroup and regressing the ownership of small institutional investors (SIO) on our suite of 
explanatory variables. We found that on average the total ownership of the small investors is 
1.4% to 1.5% less (columns 5 to 7 in Table 5.10) in family controlled businesses but at the 10% 
level of significance if TobQ is included and at 5% if ROA replaces TobQ.  Thus, our results are 
consistent with hypothesis 4 and Fernando et al. (2014):  Institutional investors avoid family 
controlled businesses due to type 2 agency problems. 
Using the subset of family firms with dual class shares (and their matches) leads to results that 
suggest the top 1T5 institutional investors are influenced by the ability to control family firm 
management but the 6T10 group is not. We also find evidence to support the role of type 2 
agency problems as a deterrent for small institutional investors. Thus, our results are consistent 
with both a control and a type 2 agency problem rationale to explain institutional investor 
avoidance of family controlled firms. 
5.4: Robustness Test 
To test the rigour of our results we consider alternate definitions of our dependent variables. We 
also repeat our regressions using Tobit analysis to take the truncated nature of the dependent 
variables into account.  
 In our first test, we used available shares as our new denominator instead of total shares 
outstanding. We calculated available shares by subtracting shares held by family members from 
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the total shares outstanding. Fernando et al. (2014) used this measurement for testing total 
institutional ownership. We apply that measure to top five institutional investors, small 
institutional investors and retail investors (individual investors and institutional investors who do 
not submit F-13 report) and relabel the dependent variables with an AS suffix. The limitation of 
this approach is that institutional ownership is now a function of percentage family ownership. 
Therefore, changes in family ownership will change the institutional ownership, even if 
institutional investors do not change their holdings. The modified dependent variables and our 
models are shown in equations (5.1) to (5.4). 
𝑇𝐼𝑂𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + B7𝑆𝑇it +
𝐵8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵9𝐿𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵11𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵13𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡.  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (5.1) 
1𝑇5𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + B7𝑆𝑇it +
𝐵8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵9𝐿𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵11𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵13𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …(5.2) 
𝑆𝐼𝑂𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + B7𝑆𝑇it +
𝐵8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵9𝐿𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵11𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵13𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . … (5.3) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝑋𝑖𝑡 + B7𝑆𝑇it +
𝐵8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵9𝐿𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝐵11𝑆&𝑃𝐶𝑜 + 𝐵12𝑆&𝑃𝑡 + 𝐵13𝑇𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝐵𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝐵𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡.  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (5.4) 
𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝟓. 𝟏𝟏, 𝟓. 𝟏𝟐, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝟓. 𝟏𝟑 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 
In our robustness tests, we exclude any observations with a sum of institutional ownership and 
family ownership greater than 100%. We excluded those observations to avoid any potential data 
errors such as double counting. We also excluded the matched firm to have a balanced portfolio. 
Table 5.11 illustrates that the results don’t change for the total institutional and the one to five 
percent categories. Family controlled businesses have less total institutional ownership and less 
top five institutional ownership. However, columns 5, and 6, show that small institutional 
ownership is not significantly lower for family controlled businesses. But we need to be careful 
when interpreting these outcomes because the denominator changes with the change in family 
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ownership leading to a possible confusion of effects. Finally, we tested retail investors ownership 
in the family controlled businesses in model 5.4. We found that family controlled businesses 
have significantly more retail ownership than non-family controlled businesses. This also 
supports institutional investors’ preference for non-family controlled businesses.  
In our second robustness test we used Tobit regression instead of OLS. The Tobit results for TIO 
and the full sample are in Table 5.12. A comparison of the Tobit and OLS tables (Tables 5.12 
and 5.4 or 5.5) show that the TIO results are similar. Institutional investors avoid family 
controlled firms and this is tempered if the dual class dummy is in the regression. Table 5.13 
focuses on the outcomes for the dual class share subgroup. The Tobit results in Table 5.13 and 
the OLS results in Table 5.8 (for 1T5) and 5.10 (for SIO) are consistent. The details of the 
corresponding OLS results for TIO and the dual class share subsample are not included but the 
OLS coefficient on FC ranges from -.033 to -.036 and thus is consistent with the Tobit results. 
Similarly, we continue to find that there is less institutional ownership in family controlled firms 
for 1T5. On the other hand, SIO is insignificantly influenced by the family ownership structure 
when ROA is included but marginally significant if TobQ replaces ROA.  Therefore, we have 
strong evidence to support institutional investors’ avoidance of family controlled firms due to the 
inability to control management, but weaker support for the type 2 agency rationale. 
5.5: Summary of Results 
The univariate and multivariate tests show that family controlled businesses have less total 
institutional ownership (TIO), less concentrated institutional ownership (1T5), and less small 
institutional ownership (SIO). The univariate tests show that despite having similar firm 
characteristics, institutional investors will invest more in non-family controlled relative to family 
controlled businesses. The multivariate test results continue to support a lower level of 
institutional ownership when the firm is family controlled and we consider either the total 
institutional or top 5 institutional owners.  Small institutional owners are still negatively 
impacted by a family ownership structure but at a lower level of significance and they are 
indifferent to family ownership in the Tobit robustness test when TobQ replaces ROA. These 
results support three of our hypotheses: H1: family controlled businesses have less total 
institutional ownership than non-family controlled businesses, H2A & H2B: we find that both 
high family ownership (H2A) and institutional investors avoidance (H2B) contribute to the lower 
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level of institutional ownership in family controlled businesses, and H3: institutional investors 
avoid family controlled businesses due to an inability to control management.  The evidence for 
H4: institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses due to type 2 agency problem, was 
weaker.  Thus, our findings help us to draw three conclusions. First, institutional investors avoid 
family controlled businesses. Second, both the crowding out and avoidance impacts help explain 
institutional investors’ preference for non-family controlled firms. Finally, institutional investors 
avoid family controlled businesses because they cannot influence management. But there is 
weaker evidence that small institutional investors avoid family controlled businesses and 
therefore weaker support for type 2 agency problems as a rationale for institutional investors’ 
preference for non-family controlled firms. 
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Chapter 6 
Summary of the findings 
 
6.1: Summary and Conclusions 
The goal of this thesis is to examine whether family controlled businesses are desirable 
investment targets for institutional investors and whether institutions prefer non-family 
controlled businesses. We propose three reasons that may reduce the willingness of institutional 
investors to invest in family controlled corporations. These include reduced control over the 
decisions of management which is more influenced by the controlling family, concern over self-
dealing by the controlling family, and a crowding out effect as family control of a major portion 
of the shares may reduce liquidity. Family controlled businesses are ideal to test our theory, 
because their unique structure helps us to determine the impact of lack of control over 
institutional ownership. It also gives us an idea of potential type 2 agency problems that family 
controlled businesses might have, because of the absolute control over management of the 
founding family.  
Our data set contains 45 family controlled companies. We use propensity score matching to find 
a group of non-family controlled companies that match the family controlled group on five 
criteria that are considered to be of significance to institutional investors. This is an attempt to 
find pairs of companies where each pair consists of two companies, one family controlled and 
one non-family controlled, but the two are equally desirable as investment alternatives for 
institutions. We propose that any difference in the pattern of institutional ownership is due the 
family ownership. 
Furthermore, we divide the family controlled companies between a group that has dual shares 
and a group that does not have dual shares. This division is important for the analysis as the 
voting rights related to the family controlled firms with dual shares are mainly owned by the 
controlling family. Therefore, an institutional investor’s decision to invest in a family controlled 
firm with dual shares is not going to be based on the desire to control the decisions of 
management. In addition, we find that for firms with dual shares, the ownership of the family of 
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non-voting or limited voting shares is minor (less than 2%). Thus, there is no crowding out effect 
on institutional investors.  
We analyse the magnitude of ownership by holders ranked among the top 5, institutional holders 
that rank 6 to 10, and institutional holders that rank above 10 in terms of ownership. Also, we 
analyse the magnitude of ownership by retail investors including institutional investors owning 
less $100,000 worth of shares. 
We find that major holders avoid family controlled businesses but small institutional investors 
may be indifferent to family controlled businesses. This helps us draw the conclusion that lack of 
control over management is driving the institutional investors away from family controlled 
businesses. In addition, we find evidence suggesting that after controlling for the crowding out 
effect institutional investors still avoid family controlled businesses, making our conclusion more 
robust. 
6.2: Limitation, Practical Implication, and Future Research 
Even though we got very robust and consistent results throughout the study, our research has 
some limitations. Our first limitation comes from our data. Our main data source, Thompson 
Reuters T13 database, has more than 10% of the observations reporting institutional ownership 
over 100% (one observation has 177% institutional ownership). We contacted our vendor, 
WRDS, for an explanation and they suggested that this anomaly could be due to short selling as 
Thompson Reuters is taking great care to avoid double counting. However, we have confidence 
in our results, because only a small portion of data we used had that kind of anomaly and 
Thompson Reuters T13 is the most reliable source for the institutional investors’ ownership.  Our 
second limitation is also due to the data base. We used six different data sources for our research. 
We found that there are many observations missing in each of the databases which resulted in a 
much smaller sample size for our tests. Our findings have practical implications regarding capital 
management and behavioral science. Family controlled businesses are one of the major 
contributor to the US economy, and their capability of raising capital is influenced by their 
ability to attract investors. Moreover, institutional investors’ avoidance might suppress the 
proper valuation of the shares. By, reporting more details about their activities, family controlled 
businesses can build a trustworthy relationship with their investors. Our study shows that 
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operating performance alone is insufficient to attract investors; better communication and 
reporting can ensure investors that type 2 agency problems do not exist.   
Our research does consider some important aspects of institutional investors and management 
issues, yet further research is possible regarding this subject. One possibility is to see whether the 
nature of the institutional investors such as being active or passive investors impact the behavior 
of the institutional investors when it comes to investing in family controlled businesses.  
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Table 4.1 
Variable Description 
Table 4.1 presents all the dependent and independent variables used in this paper.  
 
Variable 
name 
Variable description 
TIO = Total number of shares held by the institutional investors/ Total number of shares 
outstanding 
1T5 = Total number of shares held by the major five institutional investors/ Total number of 
shares outstanding 
6T10 = (Total number of shares held by the major ten institutional investors- Total number of 
shares held by the major five institutional investors) / Total number of shares outstanding 
SIO = (Total number of shares held by the institutional investors- Total number of shares held 
by the major ten institutional investors) / Total number of shares outstanding 
FC = Family control dummy indicating whether a firm is controlled by family or not 
PFO = Total number of shares held by the family members/ Total number of shares outstanding 
DD = 1 if the firm is family controlled and have dual class shares; 0 otherwise 
Size = ln (Total assets) 
ROA = Net income/Total assets 
DA = (Current liabilities + Non-current liabilities)/Total assets 
PO = Cash dividend/Total asset 
CX = Capital expenditure/Total asset 
ST = Net sales/Total asset 
TobQ = (Market value of common equity+ Preferred shares +Current liabilities +Non-current 
liabilities)/Total asset 
LIQ = Average monthly shares traded in a quarter/Total shares outstanding 
Beta = The beta of the stock  
S&PCo = Dummy variable indicating whether a company is in S&P 500 or not 
S&P = Return on S&P 500 index 
Int = Average (geometric mean) of 90-day T-bill rate for each quarter 
TIOAS = Total number of shares held by the institutional investors/ (Total number of shares 
outstanding-Total number of shares held by the family members) 
1T5AS = Total number of shares held by the major five institutional investors/ (Total number of 
shares outstanding-Total number of shares held by the family members) 
SIOAS = (Total number of shares held by the institutional investors- Total number of shares held 
by the major ten institutional investors)/ (Total number of shares outstanding-Total 
number of shares held by the family members) 
RIOAS = (Total number of shares outstanding- Total number of shares held by the institutional 
investors -Total number of shares held by the family members)/ (Total number of shares 
outstanding-Total number of shares held by the family members) 
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Table 4.2 
Propensity Score matching 
Table 4.2 describes variables used in the Probit regression (model 4.1) for our propensity score 
matching. The dependent variable is family dummy. ASizeit, AROAit, ADAit, APOit, and ACXit 
are the annual value of size, return on asset, debt to asset, payout, and capital expenditure the 
independent variables.  
 
Variable name Variable description 
FCi  = 1, if the business is run by a family 
    
ASizeit = ln (Total assets), (Annual data) 
AROAit = Return on assets, (Annual data) 
ADAit = Debt to asset, (Annual data) 
APOit = 
Dividend to total asset ratio, (Annual 
data) 
ACXit = 
Capital expenditure to total asset ratio, 
(Annual data) 
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Table 4.3 
Probit Regression 
Table 4.3 presents the Probit regression estimates for our propensity score matching. The 
dependent variable is family dummy. ASizeit, AROAit, ADAit, APOit and ACXit are the annual 
value of size, return on asset, debt to asset, payout, and capital expenditure the independent 
variables. Each column presents regression estimates for each year from 2010 to 2015. 
 
Dependent variable= FCi 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ASize 0.2478*** 0.2503*** 0.2527*** 0.2598*** 0.2609*** 0.2602*** 
Z-value 7.27 7.26 7.43 7.6 7.39 7.35 
AROA 0.0039 0.6726 0.2263 0.2891 1.057*** 1.516*** 
Z-value 0.12 1.69 0.91 1.23 2.61 3.06 
S.E. 0.3279 0.3268 0.3267 0.3316 0.3292 0.3302 
Z-value -0.98 -0.91 -1.14 -1.47 -1.2 -1.87 
APO 0.3694 -0.3205 0.2056 -0.0014 -0.6776 -0.9777 
Z-value 0.6 -0.41 0.51 0 -0.9 -1.6 
ACX 0.4839 0.4543 0.6898 1.0601 0.1248 1.8511 
Z-value 0.43 0.44 0.81 1.21 0.29 1.7 
Cons -4.0268*** -4.0969*** -4.1204*** -4.1939*** -4.2380*** -4.2388*** 
Z-value -13.2 -12.91 -13.23 -13.4 -12.97 -12.85 
Pseudo R2 0.1665 0.1749 0.177 0.1837 0.1879 0.1906 
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Table 4.4 
Testing the difference of mean 
Table 4.4 presents the result of the difference in the means test of ASize, AROA, ADA, APO and ACX before the matching 
and after the matching from the year 2010 to 2015 inclusive. 
 
Panel A 
2010 2011 
 
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
 
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
ASize Unmatched 9.031 5.794 3.237 0.408 7.940 ASize Unmatched 9.087 5.775 3.313 0.408 8.120 
 
Match 9.031 8.872 0.159 0.334 0.480 
 
Match 9.087 9.098 -0.011 0.293 -
0.040 
AROA Unmatched 0.059 -0.048 0.107 0.702 0.150 AROA Unmatched 0.065 -0.145 0.210 0.143 1.470 
 
Match 0.059 0.046 0.014 0.014 1.000 
 
Match 0.065 0.059 0.006 0.012 0.470 
ADE Unmatched 0.231 0.230 0.001 0.067 0.010 ADE Unmatched 0.233 0.233 -0.001 0.061 -
0.010  
Match 0.231 0.275 -0.044 0.042 -
1.040 
 
Match 0.233 0.259 -0.026 0.036 -
0.740 
APO Unmatched 0.019 0.020 -0.001 0.019 -
0.030 
APO Unmatched 0.018 0.017 0.001 0.017 0.060 
 
Match 0.019 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.930 
 
Match 0.018 0.019 0.000 0.004 -
0.090 
ACX Unmatched 0.040 0.040 0.000 0.011 -
0.010 
ACX Unmatched 0.046 0.047 0.000 0.012 -
0.010  
Match 0.040 0.042 -0.002 0.009 -
0.220 
 
Match 0.046 0.056 -0.009 0.011 -
0.840 
 
 
Panel B 
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2012 2013 
 
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
 
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
ASize Unmatched 9.125 5.720 3.405 0.411 8.290 ASize Unmatched 9.193 5.755 3.439 0.406 8.460 
 
Match 9.125 9.165 -0.040 0.283 -0.140 
 
Match 9.193 9.283 -0.090 0.277 -0.320 
AROA Unmatched 0.062 -0.208 0.271 0.150 1.800 AROA Unmatched 0.067 -0.224 0.291 0.160 1.810 
 
Match 0.062 0.070 -0.008 0.014 -0.590 
 
Match 0.067 0.066 0.001 0.013 0.070 
ADE Unmatched 0.238 0.270 -0.032 0.185 -0.180 ADE Unmatched 0.234 0.253 -0.019 0.073 -0.260 
 
Match 0.238 0.291 -0.053 0.036 -1.450 
 
Match 0.234 0.294 -0.060 0.032 -1.860 
APO Unmatched 0.032 0.026 0.006 0.022 0.250 APO Unmatched 0.020 0.039 -0.019 0.162 -0.120 
 
Match 0.032 0.026 0.006 0.009 0.700 
 
Match 0.020 0.017 0.003 0.004 0.660 
ACX Unmatched 0.050 0.050 0.000 0.014 0.010 ACX Unmatched 0.051 0.046 0.005 0.013 0.380 
 
Match 0.050 0.048 0.003 0.010 0.260 
 
Match 0.051 0.047 0.005 0.010 0.450 
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Panel C 
2014 2015 
 
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
 
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
ASize Unmatched 9.257 5.890 3.367 0.403 8.350 ASize Unmatched 9.207 6.053 3.154 0.385 8.190 
 
Match 9.257 9.260 -0.003 0.281 -0.010 
 
Match 9.207 9.175 0.032 0.280 0.120 
AROA Unmatched 0.070 -0.239 0.309 0.224 1.380 AROA Unmatched 0.066 -0.288 0.354 0.695 0.510 
 
Match 0.070 0.070 0.001 0.016 0.040 
 
Match 0.066 0.075 -0.009 0.016 -0.560 
ADE Unmatched 0.252 0.267 -0.015 0.083 -0.180 ADE Unmatched 0.254 0.283 -0.029 0.086 -0.330 
 
Match 0.252 0.295 -0.043 0.039 -1.100 
 
Match 0.254 0.277 -0.023 0.039 -0.580 
APO Unmatched 0.020 0.019 0.001 0.017 0.030 APO Unmatched 0.023 0.022 0.002 0.021 0.080 
 
Match 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.005 -0.040 
 
Match 0.023 0.021 0.002 0.006 0.330 
ACX Unmatched 0.049 0.048 0.001 0.019 0.070 ACX Unmatched 0.048 0.041 0.007 0.010 0.680 
 
Match 0.049 0.048 0.002 0.010 0.160 
 
Match 0.048 0.050 -0.002 0.010 -0.180 
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Table 4.5 
Portfolio performance 
Table 4.5 presents the monthly return and the value of family businesses portfolio and non-family businesses portfolio from year 2011 
to 2015. The table presents the return and the value of the portfolios at the end date of the month. Portfolios are equally weighted and 
the weight is adjusted at the beginning of each month. 
Panel A 
  
Family  Non-family Family Non-family 
 
Family  Non-family Family Non-family 
Year Month return return Value Value Year Month return return Value Value 
2011 Jan -0.007 0.007 0.993 1.007 2012 Jan 0.086 0.079 1.175 1.181  
Feb 0.059 0.040 1.052 1.048 
 
Feb 0.067 0.052 1.254 1.243  
Mar 0.009 0.003 1.061 1.051 
 
Mar 0.031 0.033 1.292 1.284  
Apr 0.061 0.051 1.126 1.104 
 
Apr -0.013 -0.014 1.275 1.266  
May -0.011 -0.005 1.114 1.099 
 
May -0.059 -0.079 1.199 1.166  
Jun -0.008 -0.011 1.105 1.087 
 
Jun 0.027 0.032 1.231 1.203  
Jul -0.026 -0.019 1.076 1.067 
 
Jul 0.002 -0.021 1.234 1.178  
Aug -0.063 -0.034 1.008 1.031 
 
Aug 0.041 0.024 1.284 1.207  
Sep -0.062 -0.061 0.946 0.968 
 
Sep 0.025 0.033 1.316 1.247  
Oct 0.162 0.125 1.098 1.089 
 
Oct 0.033 0.003 1.360 1.251  
Nov 0.002 -0.003 1.100 1.086 
 
Nov 0.006 0.033 1.367 1.292  
Dec -0.017 0.008 1.082 1.095 
 
Dec 0.015 0.023 1.388 1.322 
 
  
Family  Non-family Family Non-family 
 
Family  Non-family Family Non-family 
Year Month return return Value Value Year Month return return Value Value 
2013 Jan 0.081 0.057 1.501 1.397 2014 Jan -0.045 -0.037 1.909 1.772  
Feb 0.009 0.031 1.515 1.441 
 
Feb 0.064 0.075 2.031 1.905  
Mar 0.061 0.033 1.608 1.488 
 
Mar 0.010 -0.001 2.050 1.904  
Apr 0.015 0.029 1.633 1.532 
 
Apr 0.018 -0.004 2.088 1.896  
May 0.030 0.045 1.681 1.602 
 
May 0.035 0.029 2.160 1.951 
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Jun -0.007 -0.007 1.670 1.590 
 
Jun 0.020 0.015 2.205 1.980  
Jul 0.076 0.054 1.796 1.676 
 
Jul -0.050 -0.030 2.094 1.920  
Aug -0.044 -0.041 1.717 1.607 
 
Aug 0.047 0.062 2.194 2.040  
Sep 0.055 0.046 1.811 1.682 
 
Sep -0.053 -0.025 2.077 1.990  
Oct 0.040 0.040 1.884 1.749 
 
Oct 0.043 0.034 2.167 2.057  
Nov 0.039 0.034 1.958 1.809 
 
Nov 0.035 0.056 2.243 2.171  
Dec 0.021 0.017 1.999 1.840 
 
Dec 0.007 0.031 2.260 2.239 
 
 
 Panel B   
Family  Non-family Family Non-family 
Year Month return return Value Value 
2015 Jan -0.039 -0.018 2.171 2.198  
Feb 0.090 0.053 2.368 2.315  
Mar 0.003 0.002 2.374 2.321  
Apr -0.019 -0.003 2.329 2.313  
May 0.007 0.000 2.346 2.313  
Jun -0.013 -0.008 2.315 2.295  
Jul -0.003 -0.001 2.309 2.293  
Aug -0.026 -0.057 2.250 2.162  
Sep -0.022 -0.038 2.199 2.080  
Oct 0.071 0.058 2.356 2.200  
Nov 0.006 -0.006 2.369 2.187  
Dec -0.029 -0.007 2.301 2.171 
 
 
Family Non-family 
Mean 0.014896862 0.013691157 
Variance 0.00190237 0.001415352 
Observations 60 60 
df 118 
 
Tvalue 0.162142432 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.871471013 
 
t Critical two-tail 1.980272249 
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Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 reports sample statistics for the principal variables. Panel A shows the institutional 
investors’ holdings over the 2010 to 2015 period, Panel B shows the firm characteristics over the 
2010 to 2015-time period and Panel C presents the return on S&P 500 and T-bill rates. In panel 
A, We define total institutional ownership (TIO) as the total number of shares held by the 
institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding, top five institutional 
investors’ ownership (1T5) as the total number of shares held by the top five institutional 
investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding, ownership of sixth to tenth 
institutional investors (6T10) is number of shares held by the sixth to tenth ranked institutional 
investors within a firm divided by the total number of shares outstanding and the small 
institutional ownership (SIO) is the is number of shares held by small investors within a firm 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. In panel B, FC is the family control dummy, 
PFO is the ownership of the family members expressed as a percentage total share outstanding, 
DD is also a dummy variable whether the family controlled firm in question is has dual class 
shares, size (SIZE) is the log of total asset, return on asset (ROA) is the net income divided by 
total asset, debt to asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities divided 
by total asset, payout (PO) is cash dividend divided by total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the 
capital expenditure divided by the total assets, Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the sum of market value of 
common equity, preferred share, current liabilities, and non-current liabilities divided by total 
asset, sales turnover (ST) is net sales divided by total asset, liquidity (LIQ) is the total share 
traded in that quarter divided by total share outstanding, Beta is the quarterly beta, and S&PCo is 
a dummy variable indicating whether a company is a member of S&P 500 index. In panel C, 
S&P 500 is the return on S&P 500 index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest 
rate is the average of the monthly T-bill rate (geometric mean), used to represent borrowing 
costs. 
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Descriptive Statistics  
Obs Mean Std Min Max Median 95% Conf. interval 
         
Panel A: Institutional Investors’ Holdings 
TIO 1,266 0.6225*** 0.2148 0.0011 0.9970 0.68262 0.47443 0.80964 
1T5 1,266 0.2528*** 0.1079 0.0011 0.8721 0.24557 0.19558 0.30548 
6T10 1,266 0.0931*** 0.0411 0.0000 0.2252 0.09591 0.0619 0.1271 
SIO 1,266 0.2842*** 0.1249 0.0000 0.5602 0.30033 0.18555 0.39467 
RO 1,266 0.3015*** 0.1752 0.0030 0.9989 0.24193 0.14854 0.37333 
            
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
FC 1,266 0.500*** 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
PFO 1,266 0.0760*** 0.159019 0 0.704242 0 0 0.0499 
DD 1,266 0.2424*** 0.428762 0 1 0 0 0 
Size 1,146 9.3029*** 1.2837 5.3759 12.3575 8.4928 8.4928 9.9743 
ROA 1,146 0.0154*** 0.0193 -0.0948 0.2913 0.0139 0.0068 0.0217 
DA 1,146 0.3196*** 0.2263 0 1.5849 0.2957 0.1775 0.4480 
PO 1,146 0.0053*** 0.0168 -0.0305 0.5300 0.0029 0.0002 0.0075 
CX 1,146 0.0117*** 0.0222 -0.5587 0.1822 0.0086 0.0045 0.0162 
ST 1,146 0.2834*** 0.2097 0.0060 1.7054 0.2235 0.1353 0.3809 
TobQ 1,146 1.4284*** 0.8862 0.0624 5.6691 1.2158 0.8583 1.8419 
LIQ 1,109 0.0054*** 0.0036 0.0002 0.0302 0.0046 0.0029 0.0072 
Beta 1,064 0.925 2.121 -13.788 14.948 .8872 -1.9644 3.9297 
S&PCo 1,064 0.658 0.475 0 1 1 0 1 
         
Panel C: Market and economic conditions 
Int 1,266 0.0268*** 0.0629 -0.1433 0.1200 0.0439 -0.0023 0.0645 
S&P 1,266 0.0474*** 0.0307 0.0100 0.1153 0.0348 0.0199 0.0643 
 
 
 *        different from 0, at 10% level of significance 
 **      different from 0, at 5% level of significance 
 ***    different from 0, at 1% level of significance 
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Table 5.2 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 5.3 presents the correlation among, institutional ownership, top five institutional investor’s ownership, sixth to tenth institutional 
investor’s ownership, ownership of institutional investors, family control dummy, percentage family ownership, dual class dummy, 
size, return on assets (ROA), debt to assets (DA), Pay out (PO), Capital expenditure (CX), Tobin’s Q (TobQ), sales turnover (ST), 
Liquidity (LIQ), Beta, S&P 500 dummy, S&P 500 and interest rate. Below the value of the correlation. 
 
TIO 1T5 6T10 SIO RO FC PFO DD Size ROA 
TIO 1          
1T5 0.606*** 1         
6T10 0.843*** 0.462*** 1        
SIO 0.793*** 0.011 0.625*** 1       
RO -0.571*** -0.497*** -0.533*** -0.323*** 1      
FC -0.360*** -0.217*** -0.252*** -0.300*** -0.066** 1     
PFO -0.621*** -0.349*** -0.476*** -0.528*** -0.253*** 0.492*** 1    
DD 0.094*** 0.059*** 0.079*** 0.073** 0.058* 0.588*** -0.187*** 1   
Size -0.145*** -0.210*** -0.265*** 0.019 0.128*** 0.009 0.041 -0.081*** 1  
ROA 0.028 -0.096*** -0.026 0.122*** -0.034 0.015 0.020 0.023 -0.157*** 1 
DA 0.146*** 0.077** 0.165*** 0.112*** -0.017*** 0.007 -0.136*** -0.038 -0.021 -0.046 
PO -0.103*** -0.113*** -0.092** -0.042 0.094 0.007 0.032 -0.009 -0.030 0.149*** 
CX -0.059* -0.151*** -0.005 0.029 -0.015 -0.036 0.116*** -0.149*** -0.113*** 0.060** 
ST -0.018 -0.089*** 0.018 0.036 -0.044 0.033 0.095*** 0.059* -0.308*** 0.204*** 
TobQ 0.045 -0.082*** -0.027 0.137*** -0.040 -0.082*** 0.010 -0.126*** -0.263*** 0.457*** 
LIQ 0.490*** 0.204*** 0.464*** 0.446*** -0.267*** -0.139*** -0.317*** 0.120*** -0.186*** -0.027 
Beta 0.002 0.015 0.025 -0.015 -0.002 0.014 -0.004 -0.004 -0.057* 0.011 
S&PCo 0.185*** -0.066** 0.027 0.319*** -0.088*** -0.151*** -0.121*** -0.143*** 0.402*** 0.146*** 
S&P 0.042 0.001 0.026 0.055* -0.035 0.000 -0.012 0.009 -0.009 0.045 
Int 0.099*** 0.026 0.112*** 0.097*** -0.102*** 0.000 -0.010 -0.004 -0.015 -0.012 
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DA PO CX ST TobQ LIQ Beta S&PCo S&P Int 
DA 
1          
PO 0.104*** 1         
CX 0.164*** 0.027 1        
ST -0.011 0.027 0.171*** 1       
TobQ 0.163*** 0.176*** 0.147*** 0.141*** 1      
LIQ 0.229*** -0.075** 0.084*** 0.146*** -0.033 1     
Beta 0.020 -0.040 0.015 0.055* -0.006 0.028 1    
S&PCo 0.038 0.034 -0.077** -0.127*** 0.294*** 0.051* -0.048 1   
S&P -0.029 0.044 -0.024 0.042 0.034 -0.106*** 0.009 0.029 1  
Int -0.014 -0.035 -0.009 0.043 -0.102*** 0.055* -0.065** 0.037 0.220*** 1 
 
 
 
 *        different from 0, at 10% level of significance 
 **      different from 0, at 5% level of significance 
 ***    different from 0, at 1% level of significance 
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Table 5.3 
Univariate Test 
Table 5.3 presents the results of test of the differences in means of the institutional holding 
variables and firm specific variables. Panel 1A, and 1B presents the test of differences of mean 
of institutional ownership (TIO), top five institutional investors’ ownership (1T5), ownership of 
the sixth to tenth institutional investors (6T10) and ownership of the small investors (SIO) for the 
time from 2010 to 2015. Panel 2A, and 2C presents the firm specific control variables of our 
model: size, ROA, DA, payout, capital expenditure, Tobin’s Q, sales turnover, liquidity, beta and 
S&P 500 composites for the same period. And 3A and 3B presents TIO, 1T5 and SIO with the 
subgroup with dual class shares and their matches. 
 
Panel 1A 
  
2010 2011 2012 
  
Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs 
TIO Non-family 0.7874 0.0194 76 0.7360 0.0168 87 0.7199 0.0176 95 
 
Family 0.5257 0.0255 76 0.5076 0.0217 87 0.5617 0.0234 95 
 
Difference 0.2617*** 0.0320 
 
0.2284*** 0.0275 
 
0.1582*** 0.0293  
 
T-value 8.18     8.31     5.39     
1T5 Non-family 0.2893 0.0090 76 0.2565 0.0076 87 0.2690 0.0090 95 
 
Family 0.2171 0.0113 76 0.2158 0.0102 87 0.2375 0.0103 95 
 
Difference 0.0722*** 0.0145 
 
0.0407*** 0.0128 
 
0.0314** 0.0136  
 
T-value 4.99     3.19     2.30     
6T10 Non-family 0.1216 0.0043 76 0.1170 0.0035 87 0.1134 0.0036 95 
 
Family 0.0817 0.0044 76 0.0849 0.0045 87 0.0911 0.0044 95 
 
Difference 0.0399*** 0.0061 
 
0.0321*** 0.0057 
 
0.0223*** 0.0057  
 
T-value 6.50 
  
5.59 
  
3.91   
SIO Non-family 0.3765 0.0139 76 0.3625 0.0109 87 0.3376 0.0125 95 
 
Family 0.2311 0.0131 76 0.2290 0.0119 87 0.2533 0.0138 95 
 
Difference 0.1454*** 0.0192 
 
0.1335*** 0.0161 
 
0.0843*** 0.0186  
 
T-value 7.59 
  
8.27 
  
4.54   
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Panel 1B 
  
2013 2014 2015 
  
Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs 
TIO Non-family 0.7346 0.0150 98 0.6353 0.0156 140 0.6529 0.0143 137 
 
Family 0.5960 0.0220 98 0.5107 0.0194 140 0.5696 0.0191 137 
 
Difference 0.1386*** 0.0266  0.1247*** 0.0249  0.0833*** 0.0238  
 
T-value 5.21     5.01     3.50     
1T5 Non-family 0.2867 0.0099 98 0.2701 0.0117 140 0.2792 0.0099 137 
 
Family 0.2244 0.0085 98 0.2339 0.0110 140 0.2443 0.0089 137 
 
Difference 0.023*** 0.0131  0.0362** 0.0160  0.0349** 0.0133  
 
T-value 4.77     2.26     2.63     
6T10 Non-family 0.1109 0.0037 98 0.0883 0.0031 140 0.0895 0.0027 137 
 
Family 0.0834 0.0038 98 0.0750 0.0038 140 0.0826 0.0037 137 
 
Difference 0.0275*** 0.0053  0.0133*** 0.0049  0.0069 0.0045  
 
T-value 5.22   2.72   1.52   
SIO Non-family 0.3370 0.0102 98 0.2769 0.0092 140 0.2842 0.0080 137 
 
Family 0.2951 0.0136 98 0.2227 0.0105 140 0.2569 0.0102 137 
 
Difference 0.0419** 0.0169  0.0542*** 0.0140  0.0273** 0.0130  
 
T-value 2.47   3.89   2.11   
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Panel 2A   
2010 2011 2012   
Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs 
Size Non-family 9.129 0.1374 67 9.328 0.1394 82 9.217 0.1496 78  
Family 9.273 0.1667 67 9.412 0.1575 82 9.269 0.1704 78  
Difference -0.1443 0.2160  -0.0847 0.2103  -0.0527 0.2267   
T-value -0.67     -0.40     -0.23     
ROA Non-family 0.013 0.0014 67 0.017 0.0023 82 0.014 0.0020 78  
Family 0.016 0.0019 67 0.018 0.0026 82 0.014 0.0012 78  
Difference -0.0032 0.0023  -0.0016 0.0035  -0.0003 0.0023   
T-value -1.36     -0.45     -0.11     
DA Non-family 0.330 0.0163 67 0.330 0.0215 82 0.319 0.0202 78  
Family 0.286 0.0180 67 0.341 0.0368 82 0.360 0.0380 78  
Difference 0.0441 0.0243  -0.0103 0.0426  -0.0403 0.0430   
T-value 1.81   -0.24   -0.94   
PO Non-family 0.004 0.0007 67 0.010 0.0064 82 0.004 0.0011 78  
Family 0.006 0.0012 67 0.006 0.0007 82 0.006 0.0010 78  
Difference -0.0019 0.0014  0.0042 0.0065  -0.0015 0.0015   
T-value -1.36   0.65   -1.03   
CX Non-family 0.004 0.0088 67 0.009 0.0026 82 0.016 0.0021 78  
Family 0.009 0.0008 67 0.012 0.0010 82 0.014 0.0013 78  
Difference -0.0051 0.0088  -0.0030 0.0028  0.0025 0.0024   
T-value -0.58   -1.09   1.04   
ST Non-family 0.316 0.0307 67 0.263 0.0162 82 0.284 0.0214 78  
Family 0.292 0.0231 67 0.281 0.0214 82 0.312 0.0245 78  
Difference 0.0239 0.0385  -0.0173 0.0269  -0.0283 0.0325   
T-value 0.62   -0.64   -0.87   
TobQ Non-family 1.189 0.0554 67 1.199 0.0627 82 1.272 0.0959 78  
Family 1.252 0.0800 67 1.308 0.0774 82 1.163 0.0773 78  
Difference -0.0629 0.0972  -0.1088 0.0996  0.1091 0.1231   
T-value -0.65   -1.09   0.89   
LIQ Non-family 0.007 0.000 58 0.007 0.000 72 0.006 0.000 74  
Family 0.005 0.000 58 0.005 0.000 72 0.005 0.000 74  
Difference 0.0016*** 0.0006  0.0023*** 0.0006  0.0008 0.0006   
T-value 2.68     3.72     1.31     
Beta Non-family 0.644 0.1151 57 1.374 0.1877 71 0.297 0.3884 74  
Family 0.932 0.1513 57 1.041 0.1311 71 0.440 0.2566 74  
Difference -0.2881 0.1901  0.3324 0.2290  -0.1429 0.4655   
T-value -1.52   1.45   -0.31   
S&PCo Non-family 0.842 0.0487 57 0.718 0.0538 71 0.676 0.0548 74  
Family 0.632 0.0645 57 0.634 0.0576 71 0.487 0.0585 74  
Difference 0.2105*** 0.0808  0.0845 0.0788  0.1892 0.0802   
T-value 2.61   1.07   2.36   
 
  
52 
 
 
 
 
Panel 2B   
2013 2014 2015   
Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs 
Size Non-family 9.403 0.1337 89 9.290 0.1037 130 9.286 0.1071 127  
Family 9.455 0.1539 89 9.234 0.1049 130 9.321 0.1108 127  
Difference -0.0521 0.2039  0.0554 0.1475  -0.0356 0.1541   
T-value -0.26     0.38     -0.23     
ROA Non-family 0.019 0.0039 89 0.013 0.0019 130 0.013 0.0012 127  
Family 0.018 0.0014 89 0.016 0.0014 130 0.016 0.0015 127  
Difference 0.0002 0.0041  -0.0027 0.0023  -0.0025 0.0019   
T-value 0.06     -1.14     -1.27     
DA Non-family 0.308*** 0.0203 89 0.314*** 0.0143 130 0.321*** 0.0175 127  
Family 0.279*** 0.0174 89 0.318*** 0.0233 130 0.330*** 0.0243 127  
Difference 0.0288 0.0267  -0.0039 0.0273  -0.0088 0.0299   
T-value 1.08   -0.14   -0.30   
PO Non-family 0.004 0.0006 89 0.005 0.0004 130 0.004 0.0004 127  
Family 0.006 0.0008 89 0.005 0.0005 130 0.005 0.0005 127  
Difference -0.0020** 0.0010  -0.0001 0.0007  -0.0011 0.0006   
T-value -2.11   -0.18   -1.63   
CX Non-family 0.012 0.0018 89 0.013 0.0011 130 0.012 0.0017 127  
Family 0.010 0.0007 89 0.013 0.0010 130 0.012 0.0009 127  
Difference 0.0024 0.0020  0.0001 0.0015  0.0001 0.0019   
T-value 1.21   0.10   0.06   
ST Non-family 0.323 0.0358 89 0.280 0.0168 130 0.229 0.0151 127  
Family 0.316 0.0230 89 0.288 0.0178 130 0.261 0.0157 127  
Difference 0.007 0.0426  -0.008 0.0245  -0.032 0.0218   
T-value 0.16   -0.34   -1.46   
TobQ Non-family 1.557 0.0852 89 1.743 0.0999 130 1.601 0.0978 127  
Family 1.494 0.0874 89 1.477 0.0807 130 1.450 0.0854 127  
Difference 0.063 0.1220  0.266** 0.1284  0.150 0.1298   
T-value 0.52   2.07   1.16   
LIQ Non-family 0.005 0.000 87 0.006 0.000 121 0.006 0.000 126  
Family 0.004 0.000 87 0.005 0.000 121 0.006 0.000 126  
Difference 0.0011** 0.0005  0.0008 0.0005  0.0002 0.0005   
T-value 2.40     1.63     0.36     
Beta Non-family 1.165 0.351 86 1.179 0.1880 118 0.637 0.1520 126 
 Family 0.975 0.271 86 1.366 0.1648 118 0.817 0.1696 126 
 Difference 0.190 0.444  -0.186 0.2500  -0.1796 0.2277  
 T-value 0.43   -0.75   -0.79   
S&PCo Non-family 0.883 0.034 86 0.686 0.042 118 0.650 0.042 126 
 Family 0.662 0.051 86 0.567 0.045 118 0.563 0.044 126 
 Difference 0.220*** 0.062  0.118 0.062  0.087 0.061  
 T-value 3.57   1.89   1.42   
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Panel 3A 
  
2010 2011 2012 
  
Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs 
TIO Non-family 0.7401 0.0333 28 0.6910 0.0259 33 0.7462 0.0316 33 
 
Family 0.6277 0.0362 28 0.6257 0.0248 33 0.6535 0.0328 33 
 
Difference 0.1124** 0.0492  0.0653* 0.0359  0.0927** 0.0456  
 
T-value 2.28   1.82   2.03   
1T5 Non-family 0.2846 0.0130 28 0.2562 0.0150 33 0.2885 0.0164 33 
 
Family 0.2854 0.0160 28 0.2351 0.0074 33 0.2714 0.0131 33 
 
Difference -0.0008 0.0206  0.0210 0.0167  0.0171 0.0210  
 
T-value -0.04   1.26   0.81   
SIO Non-family 0.3433 0.0264 28 0.3279 0.0119 33 0.3365 0.0155 33 
 
Family 0.2466 0.0211 28 0.2857 0.0160 33 0.2764 0.0204 33 
 
Difference 0.0968*** 0.0338  0.0421** 0.0199  0.0601** 0.0257  
 
T-value 2.86   2.11   2.34   
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 *        different from 0, at 10% level of significance 
 **      different from 0, at 5% level of significance 
 ***    different from 0, at 1% level of significance 
 
Panel 3B 
  
2013 2014 2015 
  
Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs Mean S.E. Obs 
TIO Non-family 0.7179 0.0197 55 0.6538 0.0184 55 0.6792 0.0144 68 
 
Family 0.6927 0.0260 55 0.6463 0.0251 55 0.6748 0.0209 68 
 
Difference 0.0253 0.0326  0.0075 0.0311  0.0044 0.0254  
 
T-value 0.77   0.24   0.17   
1T5 Non-family 0.2762 0.0106 55 0.2683 0.0124 55 0.2860 0.0134 68 
 
Family 0.2498 0.0078 55 0.2664 0.0133 55 0.2720 0.0102 68 
 
Difference 0.0264** 0.0132  0.0019 0.0182  0.0141 0.0169  
 
T-value 2.00   0.10   0.83   
SIO Non-family 0.3340 0.0112 55 0.2905 0.0089 55 0.3041 0.0097 68 
 
Family 0.3450 0.0180 55 0.2848 0.0173 55 0.3080 0.0139 68 
 
Difference -0.0110 0.0212  0.0057 0.0194  -0.0039 0.0169  
 
T-value -0.52   0.29   -0.23   
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Table 5.4 
Multivariate Test-1 
Relationship between family controlled businesses and total institutional ownership 
 
Table 5.4 presents the regression estimates of model 4.2. Here TIO is the total institutional ownership. FC is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the business in question is family controlled or not, size (SIZE) is the log of total asset, return on asset (ROA) is the 
net income divided by total asset, debt to asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, 
payout (PO) is cash dividend divided by total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the capital expenditure divided by the total assets. 
Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the sum of market value of common equity, preferred share, current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided 
by total asset, sales turnover (ST) is net sales divided by total asset, liquidity (LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by 
total share outstanding. Beta is the estimated beta using quarterly trading volume and S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether 
a firm is a member of S&P 500 index. S&P 500 is the return on S&P 500 index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest 
rate is the average of the monthly T-bill rate (geometric mean), used to represent borrowing costs. 
 
Dependent Variable: TIO 
 
Expected Sign Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
FC - -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.117*** 
    -13.34 -13.57 -12.33 -12.32 -11.58 -11.63 -11.75 
Size - -0.005 -0.012*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.020*** 
    -1.1 -2.47 -0.9 -0.89 -3.64 -3.03 -3.57 
ROA +/- 0.690** 1.368*** 0.833*** 0.832*** 
 
0.558** 0.796*** 
    2.3 4.09 2.71 2.71 
 
1.99 2.62 
DA + 0.148*** 0.156*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.094*** 
    5.24 5.57 3.63 3.62 3.37 3.41 3.68 
PO - -1.672*** -1.472*** -0.916*** -0.914*** -0.809*** -0.925*** -0.863*** 
    -4.93 -4.37 -3.14 -3.13 -2.79 -3.21 -2.98 
CX +/- 0.056 0.258 -1.075*** -1.075*** -1.127*** -1.179*** -1.125*** 
    0.21 0.98 -2.78 -2.78 -2.93 -3.08 -2.94 
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ST +/- 
 
-0.189*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.195*** -0.205*** -0.208*** 
    
 
-5.5 -6.92 -6.92 -6.61 -6.88 -6.97 
TobQ +/- 
 
-0.022*** 0.000 0.000 -0.008 
 
-0.016** 
    
 
-2.75 0.01 0.02 -1.12 
 
-2.04 
LIQ + 
  
26.14*** 26.14*** 24.24*** 24.92*** 24.15*** 
    
  
16.83 16.82 15.19 16.1 15.17 
Beta +/- 
   
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
0.13 0.14 0.17 0.11 
S&PCo + 
    
0.071*** 0.058*** 0.707*** 
      
4.88 4.37 4.83 
S&P +/- 0.023 0.031 0.144 0.144 0.143 0.139 0.140 
    0.23 0.32 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.6 1.61 
Int + 0.249 0.262 0.015 0.015 0.024 0.020 0.031 
    0.9 0.96 0.06 0.06 0.1 0.08 0.13 
Const 
 
0.633*** 0.751*** 0.567*** 0.566*** 0.712*** 0.658*** 0.707*** 
    9.74 11.18 8.97 8.92 10.26 10.12 10.21 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,146 1,146 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 
R square 0.2377*** 0.2616*** 0.4347*** 0.4348*** 0.4435*** 0.445*** 0.4472*** 
Adj R square 0.2242*** 0.2471*** 0.4222*** 0.4217*** 0.4307*** 0.4322*** 0.4339*** 
 
  
  
 
 
57 
Table 5.5 
Multivariate Test-2 
Relationship between family controlled businesses and total institutional ownership after controlling for the percentage family         
ownership 
 
Table 5.5 presents the regression estimates of model 4.3. Here TIO is the total institutional ownership. FC is the a dummy variables 
indicating whether the business in question is family controlled or not, PFO is the ownership of the family members expressed as a 
percentage total share outstanding, size (SIZE) is the log of total asset, return on asset (ROA) is the net income divided by total asset, 
debt to asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, payout (PO) is cash dividend 
divided by total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the sum of 
market value of common equity, preferred share, current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, sales turnover 
(ST) is net sales divided by total asset, liquidity (LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by total share outstanding. Beta 
is the estimated beta using quarterly trading volume and S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is a member of S&P 
500 index. S&P 500 is the return on S&P 500 index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest rate is the average of the 
monthly T-bill rate (geometric mean), used to represent borrowing costs. 
 
Dependent Variable: TIO 
 
Expected Sign Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
FC - -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
  
-3.39 -3.68 -3.35 -3.35 -2.87 -2.95 -3.04 
PFO - -0.744*** -0.725*** -0.601*** -0.601*** -0.595*** -0.594*** -0.591*** 
  
-21.06 -20.45 -17.76 -17.75 -17.65 -17.67 -17.57 
Size - -0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.012** -0.009** -0.011** 
  
-0.25 -1.23 0.27 0.27 -2.38 -2.01 -2.33 
ROA +/- 0.697*** 1.060*** 0.615** 0.615*** 
 
0.462* 0.590** 
  
2.74 3.71 2.29 2.28 
 
1.87 2.21 
DA + 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.051** 0.051** 0.046** 0.048** 0.052** 
  
3.91 4.1 2.27 2.27 2.06 2.17 2.33 
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PO - -1.299*** -1.199*** -0.811*** -0.811*** -0.732*** -0.806*** -0.773*** 
  
-4.51 -4.17 -3.17 -3.16 -2.88 -3.18 -3.04 
CX +/- 0.563** 0.670*** -0.048 -0.048 -0.099 -0.128 -0.104 
  
2.49 2.97 -0.14 -0.14 -0.29 -0.38 -0.3 
ST +/- 
 
-0.121*** -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.148*** -0.156*** -0.158*** 
   
-4.09 -5.93 -5.92 -5.68 -5.93 -5.98 
TobQ +/- 
 
-0.010 0.004 0.004 -0.003 
 
-0.008 
   
-1.49 0.66 0.66 -0.43 
 
-1.24 
LIQ + 
  
19.33*** 19.33*** 17.91*** 18.27*** 17.88*** 
    
13.67 13.67 12.39 12.96 12.39 
Beta +/- 
   
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
0 0 0.01 -0.02 
S&PCo + 
    
0.056*** 0.048*** 0.666*** 
      
4.35 4.18 4.31 
S&P +/- 0.014 0.018 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.103 0.103 
  
0.17 0.21 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.35 1.35 
Int + 0.271 0.278 0.109 0.109 0.115 0.114 0.119 
  
1.16 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.54 0.54 0.56 
Const 
 
0.633*** 0.702*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.669*** 0.639*** 0.666*** 
  
11.49 12.23 10.02 9.97 10.98 11.2 10.94 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,146 1,146 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 
R square 0.4534*** 0.4621*** 0.5663*** 0.5663*** 0.572*** 0.5733*** 0.574*** 
Adj R square 0.4431*** 0.4511*** 0.5563*** 0.5559*** 0.5617*** 0.5631*** 0.5633*** 
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Table 5.6 
Multivariate Test-3 
Relationship between family controlled businesses and total institutional ownership after controlling for dual class dummy 
 
Table 5.6 presents the regression estimates of model 4.4. Here TIO is the total institutional ownership. FC is the a dummy variables 
indicating whether the business in question is family controlled or not, DD is also a dummy variable whether the family controlled 
firm in question is has dual class shares, size (SIZE) is the log of total asset, return on asset (ROA) is the net income divided by total 
asset, debt to asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, payout (PO) is cash dividend 
divided by total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the sum of 
market value of common equity, preferred share, current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, sales turnover 
(ST) is net sales divided by total asset, liquidity (LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by total share outstanding. Beta 
is the estimated beta using quarterly trading volume and S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is a member of S&P 
500 index. S&P 500 is the return on S&P 500 index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest rate is the average of the 
monthly T-bill rate (geometric mean), used to represent borrowing costs. 
 
Dependent Variable: TIO 
 
Expected Sign Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
FC - -0.267*** -0.266*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.205*** 
    -21.25 -21.51 -17.47 -17.47 -17.36 -17.4 -17.4 
DD - 0.232*** 0.233*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 
  
15.77 15.87 11.61 11.61 12.33 12.34 12.2 
Size - 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
    0.2 -0.99 0.14 0.17 -3.41 -3.19 -3.37 
ROA +/- 0.627** 0.971*** 0.624** 0.622** 
 
0.451* 0.572** 
    2.31 3.2 2.16 2.15 
 
1.72 2.01 
DA + 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.120*** 0.124*** 
    7.65 7.69 5.04 5.03 4.97 5.07 5.18 
PO - -1.541*** -1.431*** -0.986*** -0.981*** -0.885*** -0.955*** -0.923*** 
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    -5.02 -4.7 -3.58 -3.56 -3.27 -3.54 -3.41 
CX +/- 0.543*** 0.708*** -0.350 -0.348 -0.374 -0.401 -0.380 
    2.24 2.95 -0.95 -0.94 -1.03 -1.11 -1.05 
ST +/- 
 
-0.195*** -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.200*** -0.208*** -0.209*** 
    
 
-6.27 -7.39 -7.39 -7.25 -7.45 -7.49 
TobQ +/- 
 
-0.003 0.010 0.010 -0.002 
 
-0.008 
    
 
-0.44 1.51 1.52 -0.34 
 
-1.09 
LIQ + 
  
22.26*** 22.26*** 19.81*** 20.15*** 19.79*** 
    
  
14.84 14.83 12.91 13.46 12.92 
Beta +/- 
   
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
     
0.46 0.48 0.48 0.45 
S&PCo + 
    
0.083*** 0.076*** 0.690*** 
      
6.05 6.1 6 
S&P +/- 0.037 0.037 0.132 0.132 0.128 0.126 0.126 
    0.42 0.42 1.6 1.6 1.58 1.55 1.56 
Int + 0.228 0.239 0.036 0.037 0.051 0.051 0.056 
    0.91 0.97 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.22 0.25 
Const 
 
0.581*** 0.671*** 0.529*** 0.526*** 0.693*** 0.665*** 0.690*** 
    9.86 11.01 8.88 8.8 10.68 10.94 10.64 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,146 1,146 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 
R square 0.3759*** 0.397*** 0.4997*** 0.4998*** 0.5147*** 0.516*** 0.5166*** 
Adj R square 0.3642*** 0.3847*** 0.4881*** 0.4877*** 0.503*** 0.5043*** 0.5044*** 
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Table 5.7 
Multivariate Test-4 
Relationship between family controlled businesses and total institutional ownership after controlling for the percentage family 
ownership and dual class dummy 
 
Table 5.7 presents the regression estimates of model 4.5. Here TIO is the total institutional ownership. FC is the a dummy variables indicating 
whether the business in question is family controlled or not, PFO is the ownership of the family members expressed as a percentage total share 
outstanding, DD is also a dummy variable whether the family controlled firm in question is has dual class shares, size (SIZE) is the log of total 
asset, return on asset (ROA) is the net income divided by total asset, debt to asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities 
divided by total asset, payout (PO) is cash dividend divided by total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the capital expenditure divided by the total 
assets. Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the sum of market value of common equity, preferred share, current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided by 
total asset, sales turnover (ST) is net sales divided by total asset, liquidity (LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by total share 
outstanding. Beta is the estimated beta using quarterly trading volume and S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is a member of 
S&P 500 index. S&P 500 is the return on S&P 500 index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest rate is the average of the monthly 
T-bill rate (geometric mean), used to represent borrowing costs. 
 
Dependent Variable: TIO 
 
Expected Sign Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
FC - -0.091*** -0.099*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
    -5.15 -5.64 -2.57 -2.57 -2.93 -2.95 -2.95 
PFO - -0.624*** -0.590*** -0.578*** -0.578*** -0.547*** -0.547*** -0.547*** 
  
-13.28 -12.49 -12.66 -12.64 -11.9 -11.92 -11.92 
DD + 0.071*** 0.079*** 0.013 0.013 0.027 0.027 0.026 
  
3.87 4.26 0.74 0.74 1.53 1.51 1.43 
Size - 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.012** -0.010** -0.012** 
    0.04 -0.92 0.31 0.31 -2.44 -2.11 -2.39 
ROA +/- 0.677*** 0.983*** 0.607** 0.607*** 
 
0.453* 0.572** 
    2.68 3.46 2.25 2.25 
 
1.84 2.14 
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DA + 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.055** 0.055*** 0.054** 0.057** 0.060** 
    4.77 5 2.38 2.38 2.36 2.47 2.6 
PO - -1.319*** -1.236*** -0.821*** -0.821*** -0.750*** -0.820*** -0.788*** 
    -4.61 -4.33 -3.2 -3.2 -2.95 -3.24 -3.1 
CX +/- 0.629*** 0.745*** -0.028 -0.028 -0.062 -0.090 -0.069 
    2.8 3.32 -0.08 -0.08 -0.18 -0.26 -0.2 
ST +/- 
 
-0.136*** -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.152*** -0.160*** -0.162*** 
    
 
-4.59 -5.97 -5.97 -5.82 -6.06 -6.1 
TobQ +/- 
 
-0.006 0.005 0.005 -0.002 
 
-0.008 
    
 
-0.88 0.76 0.76 -0.35 
 
-1.15 
LIQ + 
  
19.28*** 19.28*** 17.72*** 18.05*** 17.70*** 
    
  
13.62 13.61 12.22 12.75 12.22 
Beta +/- 
   
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
0.03 0.07 0.08 0.04 
S&PCo + 
    
0.059*** 0.052*** 0.666*** 
      
4.54 4.4 4.48 
S&P +/- 0.020 0.022 0.107 0.107 0.106 0.103 0.104 
    0.24 0.27 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.36 1.37 
Int + 0.261 0.268 0.107 0.107 0.112 0.112 0.117 
    1.12 1.16 0.5 0.5 0.52 0.52 0.55 
Const 
 
0.617*** 0.684*** 0.552*** 0.552*** 0.670*** 0.642*** 0.666*** 
    11.24 11.98 9.95 9.9 10.99 11.25 10.95 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,146 1,146 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 
R square 0.4605*** 0.4707*** 0.5666*** 0.5666*** 0.5729*** 0.5743*** 0.5748*** 
Adj R square 0.4500*** 0.4594*** 0.5561*** 0.5557*** 0.5622*** 0.5636*** 0.5637*** 
  
  
 
 
63 
Table 5.8 
Multivariate Test-5 
Relationship between family controlled businesses and top five institutional ownership 
 
Table 5.8 presents the regression estimates of model 4.6. Here 1T5 is the institutional ownership of top five major investors within a firm. FC is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the business in question is family controlled or not, size (SIZE) is the log of total asset, return on asset (ROA) 
is the net income divided by total asset, debt to asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, payout 
(PO) is cash dividend divided by total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the 
sum of market value of common equity, preferred share, current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, sales turnover (ST) is 
net sales divided by total asset, liquidity (LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by total share outstanding. Beta is the estimated beta 
using quarterly trading volume and S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is a member of S&P 500 index. S&P 500 is the return 
on S&P 500 index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest rate is the average of the monthly T-bill rate (geometric mean), used to 
represent borrowing costs. The regression only considers the firm with dual class shares. 
 
Dependent Variable: 1T5 
 
Expected Sign Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
FC - -0.013* -0.017** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018** -0.017** -0.019*** 
  
-1.98 -2.51 -2.75 -2.74 -2.58 -2.36 -2.68 
Size - 0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 
  
1.22 -0.63 -1.43 -1.42 -1.05 -0.09 -1.11 
ROA +/- -0.113 0.233 0.211 0.210 
 
0.003 0.210 
  
-0.63 1.19 1.11 1.1 
 
0.02 1.1 
DA + 0.095*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 
  
4.7 4.61 4.32 4.31 4.19 4.03 4.26 
PO - -0.862 -0.742 -0.156 -0.149 -0.068 -0.240 -0.141 
  
-1.64 -1.43 -0.3 -0.29 -0.13 -0.46 -0.27 
CX +/- 0.303 0.732 0.528 0.532 0.532 0.410 0.531 
  
0.92 2.24 1.49 1.5 1.5 1.16 1.49 
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ST - 
 
-0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.101*** -0.092*** -0.105*** 
   
-5.46 -5.63 -5.63 -5.42 -5.01 -5.53 
TobQ +/- 
 
-0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.011** 
 
-0.013** 
  
  
-2.9 -3 -2.99 -2.4 
 
-2.63 
LIQ + 
  
3.590*** 3.584*** 3.723*** 4.364*** 3.613*** 
    
3.22 3.21 3.22 3.86 3.12 
Beta +/- 
   
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
0.15 0.19 0.12 0.15 
S&PCo +/- 
    
-0.002 -0.016 0.297 
      
-0.12 -1.41 -0.09 
S&P +/- -0.003 0.003 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.018 0.020 
  
-0.05 0.06 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.3 0.33 
Int +/- 0.174 0.174 0.103 0.103 0.101 0.102 0.102 
  
1.05 1.08 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.63 
Const 
 
0.198*** 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.295*** 0.251*** 0.297*** 
  
4.18 6.06 5.88 5.84 5.48 4.9 5.52 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 584 584 546 546 546 546 546 
R square 0.2575*** 0.299*** 0.2929*** 0.2929*** 0.2913*** 0.2835*** 0.2929*** 
Adj R square 0.2311*** 0.2715*** 0.2617*** 0.2604*** 0.2587*** 0.2505*** 0.259*** 
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Table 5.9 
Multivariate Test-7 
Relationship between family controlled businesses and ownership of the sixth to tenth largest institutional investors 
 
Table 5.9 presents the regression estimates of model 4.7. Here 6T10 is the institutional ownership of major investors ranked sixth to tenth within a 
firm. FC is a dummy variable indicating whether the business in question is family controlled or not, size (SIZE) is the log of total asset, return on 
asset (ROA) is the net income divided by total asset, debt to asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities divided by total 
asset, payout (PO) is cash dividend divided by total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Tobin’s Q 
(TobQ) is the sum of market value of common equity, preferred share, current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, sales 
turnover (ST) is net sales divided by total asset, liquidity (LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by total share outstanding. Beta is 
the estimated beta using quarterly trading volume and S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is a member of S&P 500 index. S&P 
500 is the return on S&P 500 index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest rate is the average of the monthly T-bill rate (geometric 
mean), used to represent borrowing costs. The regression only considers the firm with dual class shares. 
 
Dependent Variable: 6T10 
 
Expected Sign Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
FC - -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
    -0.85 -1.22 -2.21 -2.24 -1 -0.51 -0.97 
Size - -0.003** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.011*** 
    -2.03 -3.03 -2.87 -2.93 -5.5 -4.38 -5.47 
ROA +/- -0.099 -0.005 -0.036 -0.034 
 
-0.136 -0.023 
    -1.34 -0.07 -0.46 -0.43 
 
-1.91 -0.29 
DA + 0.017** 0.016** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 
    2.08 1.99 3.39 3.41 4.17 3.8 4.13 
PO - -0.368* -0.327 -0.169 -0.185 -0.360* -0.406* -0.352* 
    -1.7 -1.5 -0.8 -0.87 -1.73 -1.92 -1.68 
CX +/- 0.002 0.110 0.107 0.099 0.117 0.051 0.117 
    0.02 0.8 0.73 0.67 0.82 0.36 0.82 
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ST +/- 
 
-0.025*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.030*** -0.036*** 
    
 
-3.15 -3.88 -3.86 -4.9 -3.96 -4.76 
TobQ +/- 
 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008*** 
 
-0.007*** 
    
 
-1.96 -1.35 -1.34 -4.07 
 
-3.59 
LIQ + 
  
2.666*** 2.679*** 2.007*** 2.430*** 2.019*** 
    
  
5.79 5.82 4.32 5.32 4.33 
Beta +/- 
   
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
-0.83 -0.74 -0.76 -0.73 
S&PCo +/- 
    
0.027*** 0.019*** 0.199*** 
      
5.29 4.06 5.27 
S&P +/- -0.010 -0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 
    -0.39 -0.32 0.12 0.1 0.07 0.04 0.08 
Int + 0.054 0.054 0.016 0.017 0.020 0.019 0.020 
    0.79 0.79 0.24 0.26 0.3 0.29 0.3 
Const 
 
0.169*** 0.194*** 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.199*** 0.173*** 0.199*** 
    8.66 9.38 7.69 7.73 9.19 8.37 9.17 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 584 584 546 546 546 546 546 
R square 0.3026*** 0.317*** 0.3828*** 0.3837*** 0.4149*** 0.4005*** 0.415*** 
Adj R square 0.2778*** 0.2902*** 0.3557*** 0.3553*** 0.3879*** 0.3729*** 0.3868*** 
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Table 5.10 
Multivariate Test-8 
Relationship between family controlled businesses and ownership of the small institutional investors 
 
Table 5.10 presents the regression estimates of model 4.8. Here SIO is the institutional ownership of small investors within a firm. Small investors 
are those who do not have ownership over 5% and do not fall into top ten major investors. FC is a dummy variable indicating whether the business 
in question is family controlled or not, size (SIZE) is the log of total asset, return on asset (ROA) is the net income divided by total asset, debt to 
asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, payout (PO) is cash dividend divided by total asset, 
capital expenditure (CX) is the capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the sum of market value of common equity, 
preferred share, current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, sales turnover (ST) is net sales divided by total asset, liquidity 
(LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by total share outstanding. Beta is the estimated beta using quarterly trading volume and 
S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is a member of S&P 500 index. S&P 500 is the return on S&P 500 index, used to represent 
market conditions, and the interest rate is the average of the monthly T-bill rate (geometric mean), used to represent borrowing costs. The 
regression only considers the firm with dual class shares. 
 
Dependent Variable: SIO 
 
Expected Sign Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
FC - -0.017** -0.015* -0.020** -0.021** -0.014* -0.015** -0.015* 
    -2.29 -1.88 -2.63 -2.68 -1.77 -1.98 -1.88 
Size +/- 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.014** 0.012** 0.014** 
    5.1 4.39 5.3 5.16 2.56 2.44 2.5 
ROA + 0.382 0.339 0.217 0.228 
 
0.303 0.247 
    1.91 1.52 1.01 1.06 
 
1.56 1.15 
DA + -0.020 -0.024 -0.002 -0.001 0.006 0.009 0.008 
    -0.9 -1.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.27 0.41 0.35 
PO - -1.772*** -1.956*** -1.531*** -1.610*** -1.798*** -1.857*** -1.884*** 
    -3.04 -3.31 -2.65 -2.78 -3.12 -3.2 -3.24 
CX +/- 0.015 0.139 -0.287 -0.326 -0.295 -0.263 -0.296 
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    0.04 0.37 -0.72 -0.82 -0.74 -0.67 -0.75 
ST +/- 
 
-0.046* -0.054*** -0.053** -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.064*** 
    
 
-2.09 -2.58 -2.55 -2.88 -3.3 -3.04 
TobQ + 
 
0.005 0.012** 0.012** 0.006 
 
0.004 
    
 
0.97 2.26 2.26 1.23 
 
0.65 
LIQ + 
  
9.038*** 9.100*** 8.150*** 7.814*** 8.02*** 
    
  
7.19 7.25 6.33 6.24 6.21 
Beta +/- 
   
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
  
   
-1.52 -1.42 -1.45 -1.46 
S&PCo + 
    
0.044 0.049 0.153 
      
3.08 3.81 3.11 
S&P +/- 0.020 0.019 0.058 0.056 0.058 0.055 0.055 
    0.29 0.28 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.83 
Int + 0.111 0.114 -0.022 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 
    0.6 0.62 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
Const 
 
0.187*** 0.217*** 0.088 0.095 0.150***\ 0.165*** 0.153** 
    3.56 3.86 1.53 1.65 2.5 2.92 2.54 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 584 584 546 546 546 546 546 
R square 0.3372*** 0.3446*** 0.4131*** 0.4157*** 0.4249*** 0.4259*** 0.4264*** 
Adj R square 0.3137*** 0.3189*** 0.3873*** 0.3888*** 0.3984*** 0.3995*** 0.3988*** 
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Table 5.11 
Robustness Test -1 
Estimation of regression results based on available shares 
 
Table 5.11 presents the regression estimates of model 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. Here TIOAS, 1T5AS and SIOAS is the total institutional 
ownership, top five ownership and small institutional ownership expresses as a percentage of available shares. ROAS is the retail 
investors’ ownership in a firm expressed in available shares. We calculate available shares by subtracting shares held by family from 
total shares outstanding. FC is a dummy variable indicating whether the business in question is family controlled or not, size (SIZE) is 
the log of total asset, return on asset (ROA) is the net income divided by total asset, debt to asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities 
and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, payout (PO) is cash dividend divided by total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the 
capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the sum of market value of common equity, preferred share, 
current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, sales turnover (ST) is net sales divided by total asset, liquidity 
(LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by total share outstanding. Beta is the estimated beta using quarterly trading 
volume and S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is a member of S&P 500 index. S&P 500 is the return on S&P 500 
index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest rate is the average of the monthly T-bill rate (geometric mean), used to 
represent borrowing costs.  
 
  Dependent Variable: TIOAS  Dependent Variable: 1T5AS  Dependent Variable: SIOAS  Dependent Variable: ROAS 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 
FC -0.023** -0.024*** -0.020*** -0.02*** -0.0017 -0.0037 0.023** 0.024** 
  -2.55 -2.68 -4 -3.86 -0.3 -0.65 2.55 2.68 
Size -0.013*** -0.011** -0.023*** -0.02*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.013** 0.011** 
  -2.57 -2.27 -8.2 -7.56 5.85 5.67 2.57 2.27 
ROA   0.602**   -0.01515   0.665***   -0.602** 
  
 
2.35 
 
-0.11 
 
4.16 
 
-2.35 
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DA 0.034 0.038 0.07*** 0.067*** -0.051*** -0.041*** -0.034 -0.038 
  1.48 1.67 5.55 5.23 -3.58 -2.92 -1.48 -1.67 
PO -0.72*** -0.78*** -0.41** -0.468*** -0.174 -0.178 0.720** 0.797*** 
  -2.77 -3.08 -2.84 -3.23 -1.07 -1.1 2.77 3.08 
CX 0.114 0.096 -0.338* -0.374* 0.425* 0.456** -0.113 -0.096 
  0.33 0.28 -1.76 -1.95 1.97 2.13 -0.33 -0.28 
ST -0.172*** -0.183*** -0.080*** -0.08*** -0.067*** -0.078*** 0.172*** 0.182*** 
  -6.48 -6.81 -5.39 -5.34 -4.06 -4.63 6.48 6.81 
TobQ -0.00052   -0.01018   0.013271   0.000518   
  -0.08 
 
-2.84 
 
3.29 
 
0.08 
 
LIQ 19.28*** 19.55*** 2..50*** 3.05*** 13.47*** 13.00*** -19.28*** -19.55*** 
  13.4 14.02 3.13 3.92 14.99 14.95 -13.4 -14.02 
Beta 0.000858 0.000857 -1.90E-06 8.11E-05 0.000511 0.000397 -0.00086 -0.00086 
  0.4 0.4 0 0.07 0.38 0.3 -0.4 -0.4 
S&PCo 0.0513*** 0.044*** 0.007*** -0.003*** 0.039*** 0.045*** -0.051*** -0.044*** 
  3.85 3.66 0.89 -0.46 4.68 5.9 -3.85 -3.66 
S&P 0.117997 0.115109 0.0096 0.00838 0.09672 0.095289 -0.118 -0.11511 
  1.49 1.46 0.22 0.19 1.96 1.94 -1.49 -1.46 
Int 0.127715 0.129852 0.11314 0.107188 0.011339 0.021709 -0.12771 -0.12985 
  0.57 0.58 0.92 0.86 0.08 0.16 -0.57 -0.58 
Const 0.641*** 0.614*** 0.43*** 0.39*** 0.042548 0.06435 0.36*** 0.386*** 
  10.26 10.5 12.36 11.98 1.09 1.76 5.75 6.61 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 
R square 0.3248*** 0.3285*** 0.2618*** 0.2559*** 0.3627*** 0.3668*** 0.3248*** 0.3285*** 
Adj R sq 0.3087*** 0.3125*** 0.2445*** 0.2442*** 0.3405*** 0.3475*** 0.3087*** 0.3125*** 
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Table 5.12 
Robustness Test-2.1 
Using Tobit regression for testing the consistency of the results (part 1) 
 
Table 5.12 presents the Tobit regression estimates of model 4.2, 4.3, 4,4 and 4.5. Here TIO is the total institutional ownership. FC is 
the a dummy variables indicating whether the business in question is family controlled or not, PFO is the ownership of the family 
members expressed as a percentage total share outstanding, DD is also a dummy variable whether the family controlled firm in 
question is has dual class shares, size (SIZE) is the log of total asset, return on asset (ROA) is the net income divided by total asset, 
debt to asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, payout (PO) is cash dividend 
divided by total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the sum of 
market value of common equity, preferred share, current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, sales turnover 
(ST) is net sales divided by total asset, liquidity (LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by total share outstanding. Beta 
is the estimated beta using quarterly trading volume and S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is a member of S&P 
500 index. S&P 500 is the return on S&P 500 index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest rate is the average of the 
monthly T-bill rate (geometric mean), used to represent borrowing costs 
 
Dependent Variable: TIO 
 
Expected sign Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 
FC - -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.050*** -0.051*** 
    -11.73 -11.79 -2.94 -3.01 -17.57 -17.62 -2.98 -3.00 
PFO - 
  
-0.594*** -0.593*** 
  
-0.546*** -0.546*** 
    
-17.83 -17.86 
  
-12.03 -12.05 
DD + 
    
0.172*** 0.171*** 0.027 0.027 
      
12.46 12.47 1.55 1.52 
Size - -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.012** -0.009** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.012** -0.010** 
    -3.67 -3.07 -2.41 -2.04 -3.45 -3.23 -2.47 -2.14 
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ROA +/- 
 
0.560** 
 
0.463 
 
0.453 
 
0.454* 
    
 
2.01 
 
1.9 
 
1.74 
 
1.86 
DA + 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.046** 0.049** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.055** 0.057** 
    3.43 3.48 2.1 2.21 5.04 5.15 2.41 2.52 
PO - -0.810** -0.926*** -0.733*** -0.806*** -0.886*** -0.956*** -0.751*** -0.821*** 
    -2.83 -3.25 -2.92 -3.22 -3.31 -3.59 -2.99 -3.28 
CX +/- -1.156*** -1.208*** -0.120 -0.149 -0.399 -0.426 -0.083 -0.110 
    -3.04 -3.19 -0.35 -0.44 -1.11 -1.19 -0.25 -0.33 
ST +/- -0.195*** -0.206*** -0.148*** -0.156*** -0.200*** -0.208*** -0.153*** -0.161*** 
    -6.7 -6.97 -5.76 -6.01 -7.34 -7.55 -5.9 -6.15 
TobQ +/- -0.008 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
    -1.11 
 
-0.42 
 
-0.33 
 
-0.34 
 
LIQ + 24.31*** 24.99*** 17.96*** 18.32*** 19.87*** 20.20*** 17.77*** 18.20*** 
    15.39 16.32 12.56 13.15 13.1 13.65 12.39 12.93 
Beta +/- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  
0.14 0.17 0 0.01 0.48 0.49 0.07 0.08 
S&PCo + 0.071*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.082*** 0.075*** 0.059*** 0.052*** 
  
4.9 4.39 4.38 4.2 6.09 6.14 4.57 4.43 
S&P +/- 0.145 0.141 0.107 0.104 0.130 0.128 0.108 0.105 
    1.69 1.64 1.42 1.38 1.63 1.6 1.43 1.4 
Int + 0.022 0.019 0.113 0.113 0.050 0.050 0.110 0.110 
    0.09 0.08 0.54 0.54 0.22 0.22 0.52 0.52 
Const 
 
0.714*** 0.660*** 0.670*** 0.641*** 0.694*** 0.666*** 0.671*** 0.643*** 
    10.39 10.26 11.12 11.36 10.82 11.09 11.14 11.41 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 
Pseudo R square -2.0465*** -2.0557*** -2.9571*** -2.9684*** -2.521*** -2.5306*** -2.965*** -2.9759*** 
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Table 5.13 
Robustness Test -2.2 
Using Tobit regression for testing the consistency of the results (part 2) 
 
Table 5.13 presents the regression estimates of model 4.2, 4.6 and 4.8 but uses Tobit regression and only considers the firm with dual 
class shares. Here TIO is the total institutional ownership, 1T5 is the institutional ownership of top five major investors within a firm, 
SIO is the institutional ownership of small investors within a firm. FC is a dummy variable indicating whether the business in question 
is family controlled or not, size (SIZE) is the log of total asset, return on asset (ROA) is the net income divided by total asset, debt to 
asset (DA) is the sum of current labilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, payout (PO) is cash dividend divided by 
total asset, capital expenditure (CX) is the capital expenditure divided by the total assets. Tobin’s Q (TobQ) is the sum of market value 
of common equity, preferred share, current liabilities and non-current liabilities divided by total asset, sales turnover (ST) is net sales 
divided by total asset, liquidity (LIQ) is the total share traded in that quarter divided by total share outstanding. Beta is the estimated 
beta using quarterly trading volume and S&PCo is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is a member of S&P 500 index. S&P 
500 is the return on S&P 500 index, used to represent market conditions, and the interest rate is the average of the monthly T-bill rate 
(geometric mean), used to represent borrowing costs.  
 
 
 Dependent variable: TIO Dependent variable: 1T5 Dependent variable: SIO 
 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
FC  -0.034*** -0.033** -0.020*** -0.018** -0.011 -0.013* 
   -2.96 -2.85 -2.98 -2.7 -1.53 -1.8 
Size  -0.002 0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.015** 0.012** 
   -0.2 0.55 -1.15 -0.05 2.77 2.54 
ROA  
 
0.175 
 
-0.026 
 
0.339 
   
 
0.6 
 
-0.15 
 
1.82 
DA  0.121*** 0.119*** 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.009 0.013 
   3.78 3.71 4.22 4.03 0.43 0.6 
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PO  -2.226*** -2.494*** -0.203 -0.374 -1.665*** -1.719*** 
   -2.62 -2.92 -0.41 -0.75 -3 -3.09 
CX  0.380 0.232 0.472 0.344 -0.223 -0.180 
   0.65 0.4 1.39 1.01 -0.59 -0.48 
ST  -0.196*** -0.188*** -0.102*** -0.092*** -0.058*** -0.067*** 
   -6.42 -6.25 -5.72 -5.21 -2.91 -3.43 
TobQ  -0.012 
 
-0.012** 
 
0.008 
 
   -1.57 
 
-2.78 
 
1.6 
 
LIQ  13.862*** 14.563*** 3.702*** 4.409*** 8.179*** 7.756*** 
   7.32 7.89 3.35 4.07 6.62 6.45 
Beta  -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 -1.05 -1.11 0.07 0 -1.38 -1.41 
S&PCo  0.070 0.052 -0.001 -0.017 0.043 0.049 
 
 3.31 2.74 -0.06 -1.5 3.09 3.96 
S&P  0.078 0.071 0.018 0.014 0.061 0.059 
   0.8 0.73 0.32 0.25 0.97 0.93 
Int  0.097 0.099 0.070 0.071 0.012 0.014 
   0.36 0.37 0.45 0.45 0.07 0.08 
Const  0.640*** 0.587*** 0.304*** 0.255*** 0.140*** 0.160*** 
   7.26 7.02 5.9 5.21 2.42 2.94 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 544 544 544 544 544 544 
Pseudo R2 -0.8209*** -0.8158*** -0.1758*** -0.169*** -0.3467*** -0.3475*** 
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Graph 4.1: Return on Portfolio 
Graph 4.1 presents the monthly return of family businesses portfolio and non-family businesses portfolio from year 2011 to 2015. The graph 
presents the return of the portfolios at the end date of the month. Portfolios are equally weighted and the weight is adjusted at the beginning of 
each month. 
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Graph 4.2: Value of the Portfolio 
Graph 4.2 presents the values of family businesses portfolio and non-family businesses portfolio at the end of each month from year 2011 to 2015. 
Portfolios are equally weighted and the weight is adjuster at the beginning of each month. 
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